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I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Actt
A. THE FSIA BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), a foreign state is immune from
suit, and its property from execution, unless an enumerated exception to immunity ap-
plies.' In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases involving the terrorism excep-
tions, applicable to designated state sponsors of terrorism. 2
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty involved claims against Iraq (designated a state sponsor of ter-
rorism in 1990) arising from hostage taking and torture during the first Gulf War.3 In
April 2003 shortly after the removal of the former Iraqi regime, Congress passed the
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (EWSAA), authorizing the Presi-
dent to "suspend the application of any provision of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990" and
further to "make inapplicable with respect to Iraq Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 or any other provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terror-
* Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State.
The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of State or the
United States Government. Individual contributors will be referred to at the discussion of each relevant
section.
t Contributed by Jonathan I. Blackman, Partner and Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York, New York, with assistance from Vitali Rosenfeld, Rahul Mukhi, Ann
Nee, and Micaela Davis, all associates at the same firm. The authors' firm represented the Republic of
Argentina in several of the reported cases discussed in this article.
1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609 (2009); see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993).
2. See § 1605A; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996) (repealed 2008) (both Supreme Court cases discussed here
were brought under the former FSIA § 1605(a)(7)).
3. Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183 (2009).
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ism." 4 The issue in Beaty was whether this statutory language supports Presidential power
to remove Iraq from the FSIA terrorism exception to suit, reinstating its sovereign immu-
nity. The D.C. Circuit previously held that it does not, finding the italicized proviso to be
strictly confined to the principal clause relating to legislative sanctions previously imposed
on Iraq.5
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, interpreting the EWSAA proviso as grant-
ing the President further power in addition to the principal power to suspend sanctions,
and finding that such further power included rescinding the terrorism exception to immu-
nity with respect to Iraq.6 In the alternative, even assuming that the EWSAA proviso
encompassed only statutes that impose sanctions, the Court found that the FSIA terrorism
exception would be one such law: as Justice Scalia put it, "[s]tripping the immunity that
foreign sovereigns ordinarily enjoy is as much a sanction as eliminating bilateral assistance
or prohibiting export of munitions."7 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the
terrorism exception should apply because it arose from Iraq's conduct prior to the Presi-
dent's waiver; the general presumption against statutory retroactivity was overcome by
principles of sovereign immunity.8
In Ministry of Defense & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elabi,
the plaintiff tried to execute his default judgment against Iran by attaching a U.S. judg-
ment in Iran's favor confirming an arbitration award against a third party defense contrac-
tor.9 The Ninth Circuit previously held that the property was immune under Section
1610(a) of the FSIA, which limits execution to a foreign state's property that is both in the
United States and used for a commercial activity in the United States, but found it amena-
ble to attachment under a separate exception to sovereign immunity contained in the Ter-
rorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which allows execution of a terrorism-related
judgment against statutorily defined "blocked assets" of a terrorist state.' 0 The Supreme
Court left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit's application of Section 1610(a), but reversed
with regard to the TRIA, finding that the plaintiff waived his right to attach the property
under the latter statute when he accepted compensation from the U.S. government as a
holder of a terrorism-related judgment against Iran."
B. AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF A FOREIGN STATE
1. Individuals Acting in Official Government Capacities
The circuit split continued in 2009 on whether an individual official of a foreign state
may qualify as an "agency or instrumentality thereof" under Section 1603(b) of the FSIA
4. Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-11, § 1503, 117 Stat. 559, 579
(2003) (emphasis added).
5. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. at 2187-90 (citing Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
6. Id. at 2190-91.
7. Id. at 2191.
8. Id. at 2193-94.
9. Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 129 S. Ct.
1732 (2009).
10. Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys.,
Inc., 495 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297,
§ 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337 (codified as note to 28 U.S.C. § 1610)).
11. Elabi. 129 S. Ct. at 1741. 1744.
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and accordingly be protected by sovereign immunity. In Yousuf v. Samantar, the Fourth
Circuit held that an individual does not so qualify, reasoning that "the FSIA's use of the
phrase 'separate legal person' [in Section 1603(b)] suggests that corporations or other bus-
iness entities, but not natural persons, may qualify as agencies or instrumentalities," and
found such interpretation to be "also consistent with the overall statutory scheme of the
FSIA."12 This decision followed the Seventh Circuit's holding in Enahoro v. Abubakar, but
is in sharp contrast to the majority position of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and D.C.
Circuits.13
Two circuit courts also touched upon the issue of immunity for former government
officials. In Yousuf the Fourth Circuit mentioned in dictum that, even if individual foreign
officials were covered by the FSIA as agencies or instrumentalities, such officials would be
entitled to immunity only if they were still holding their office at the time of suit.14 In
Matar v. Dichter, the Second Circuit recognized the split between the Fourth Circuit's
dictum in Yousuf and the D.C. Circuit's contrary dictum in Belhas v. Ya'alon, but declined
to decide the issue.15 Instead, the Second Circuit found that, whether or not the FSIA
applies to former officials, they were entitled to immunity under the discretionary com-
mon law principles that govern where the FSIA is silent, particularly where the position of
the Executive Branch is that the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction.' 6
2. Separateness Between Diferent Sovereign Entities
Agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state are entitled to a presumption of sepa-
rateness from the foreign state itself, which can be overcome only when an "entity is so
extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created" or
when recognizing the separate status of the entity "would work fraud or injustice." 7 In
Doe v. Holy See, the Ninth Circuit held that the "presumption of separate juridical status"
12. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 380 (4th Cir. 2009).
13. Compare Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005) with In re Terrorist Attacks on
Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2008); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th
Cir. 2002); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1999);
El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912
F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit also distinguished its earlier decision in Velasco v.
Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 399-400 (4th Cir. 2004), as ultimately deciding the "wholly separate ques-
tion of whether, and under what circumstances, the acts of an individual operate to bind a foreign sovereign
claiming immunity under the FSIA." Yousuf 552 F.3d at 379 (emphasis in original).
14. Yousuf 552 F.3d at 381-83 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 478 (2003)) (the use of
the present tense in Section 1603(b)(2) indicates that the agency or instrumentality status of a corporate entity
must "be determined at the time suit is filed").
15. Matar v. Dichter, F.3d 9, 13 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009); Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(distinguishing Dole on the ground that "the relationship between the state and its officials" is governed by
different rules).
16. Matar, 563 F.3d at 13-14. Several district courts also examined the question of whether individuals'
actions were taken outside the scope of their official capacities. See, e.g., Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d
473, 483 (D. Md. 2009) (former officer of Peruvian army not entitled to immunity because he was not acting
in official capacity during alleged participation in a massacre); Swama v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 522
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (former Kuwaiti diplomat not entitled to immunity as he was not acting in official capacity in
allegedly subjecting domestic servant to slavery); cf RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F.Supp.2d 382, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (allegation of bribe-taking was insufficient to strip former Deputy Prime Minister of Gre-
nada of sovereign immunity where the alleged acts were undertaken in official capacity).
17. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (Bancec).
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of Roman Catholic dioceses and religious orders in the United States from the Holy See, a
foreign state, was not overcome by allegations that the Holy See created the dioceses and
orders and continued to promulgate laws and regulations for them.18 Thus, the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the Holy See for the tortuous acts allegedly committed by a
U.S. archdiocese, bishop, and religious order.19
In Butler v. Sukhoi Co., the Eleventh Circuit dismissed an action brought against third
party agencies or instrumentalities of Russia to enforce a default judgment against another
Russian entity where the only "conduct" alleged as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction
was that the third parties were alter egos of the debtor. 20 The Court of Appeals also held
that the district court abused its discretion in ordering jurisdictional discovery because the
plaintiffs' alter ago allegations, even if true, failed as a matter of law to establish an excep-
ton to sovereign immunity.21
In Frontera Resources Azerba pan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azerbaipan Republic, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that "foreign states are not 'persons' entitled to rights under the Due
Process Clause."22 Frontera thus overruled Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Repub-
lic of Nigeria, which required courts to "engage in a due process scrutiny of the court's
power to exercise its authority over the state" in addition to assuring compliance with the
FSIA's jurisdictional requirements. 23 The Court did not decide whether an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state is similarly not entitled to due process protections, but
instead remanded with an instruction to examine whether the relationship between Azer-
baijan and the corporate defendant justified treating them as the same entity for purposes
of the action. 24
C. EXCEPTIONS TO JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY
1. The Waiver Exception
The waiver exception to jurisdictional immunity under the FSIA, Section 1605(a)(1),
provides that a foreign state is not immune from suit where it has "waived its immunity
either explicitly or by implication." 25 In Capital Ventures International v. Republic ofArgen-
tina, the Second Circuit found that an explicit waiver of immunity from suit in the United
States could be found on the basis of a general contractual waiver of sovereign immunity,
18. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2009); see also EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
No.03 Civ. 2507 (TPG), 2009 WL 3149601, at *3, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (coordination by large state-
owned bank of its activities with state economic and financial policies and ability for government to borrow
from state-owned bank were insufficient to show an alter ego relationship). The authors' firm represented
the Republic of Argentina in this action.
19. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1080.
20. Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 1311-13 (11th Cir. 2009).
21. Id. at 1313-14; see also Compania del Bajo Caroni (Caromin), C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
No. 08-2706-cv, 2009 VL 2476688, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2009) (district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying jurisdictional discovery).
22. Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 400 (2d Cir.
2009). This case is discussed at length below in Section VII on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
and Judgments.
23. Id. at 398-400 (citing Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308
(2d Cir. 1981)) (internal citations omitted).
24. Id. at 401.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2009).
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even if the relevant contract makes no reference to the United States, a U.S. forum, or
U.S. law. 26
2. The Commercial Activity Exception
In UNC Lear Services, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Fifth Circuit determined that
a contract for the provision of employees integrated into the air force, "vital to the opera-
tion of a national air defense system," and treated as military personnel, was sovereign in
nature, so that its subject matter did not fall within Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA.27 The
Court contrasted this with another contract for repair services for aircraft parts and com-
ponents, which it found to be clearly commercial in nature.28 Given that the second con-
tract was also primarily performed and had a place of payment in the United States, and a
U.S. company suffered financial losses from its breach, the Court of Appeals held that
there was a "sufficient direct effect in the United States" to trigger the commercial activity
exception.29
In Allfreight Worldwide Cargo, Inc. v. Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise, the Fourth Circuit
held that apparent authority of a foreign state official was insufficient to invoke the com-
mercial activity exception in the absence of actual authority to bind the sovereign, not-
withstanding the reasonableness of the contracting parties' mistake. 30 Although the
purported agent's lack of actual authority arose from a violation of an internal operating
policy that was not publicly available, it could not be deemed to "abrogate the sovereign's
immunity by creating actual authority where none exists."31
In Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. v. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Venezuela,
involving an agent's authority to settle an action brought under 1605(a)(2), the Fifth Cir-
cuit similarly emphasized that "a government entity has the power to define how and
when it enters a contract, and, by extension, how and when its agents have authority to
create contracts on its behalf."32 The Court thus held that the law of the foreign sover-
eign should be applied in determining whether the sovereign had conveyed actual author-
ity to its agent.3 3
3. The Expropriation Exception
In Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, the Ninth Circuit held that the expropriation exception
may apply even where the property was "taken" by an entity other than the foreign state.
3 4
The Court found that FSIA Section 1605(a)(3) did "not expressly require that the foreign
26. Capital Ventures Int'l v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F.3d 289, 294-95 (2d Cir. 2009). The authors' firm
represented the Republic of Argentina in this action. Cf A.R. Int'l Anti-Fraud Sys., Inc. v. Pretoria Nat'l
Cent. Bureau of Interpol, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (agreement to submit to a voluntary,
non-binding dispute resolution program was not an implicit waiver of immunity).
27. JNC Lear Serv., Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 581 F.3d 210, 216 (5th Cir. 2009).
28. Id. at 217-18.
29. Id. at 218-19.
30. Allfreight Worldwide Cargo, Inc. v. Ethiopian Airlines Enter., 307 F. App'x 721, 724 (4th Cir. 2009).
31. Id. at 725.
32. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of the Republic of Venezuela, 575 F.3d 491, 500
(5th Cir. 2009).
33. Id. at 501.
34. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); § 1605(a)(3).
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state (against whom the claim is made) be the entity that took the property in violation of
international law."3s The Court further determined that a state art foundation's "advertis-
ing and promotional activity, purchase and sale of goods and services, and the exchange of
artwork" with U.S. entities satisfied the requirement for "commercial activity in the
United States" under the expropriation exception.36
The district court in Freund v. Republic of France found that the "engaged in commercial
activity" requirement of Section 1605(a)(3) "necessitates, at least, an affirmative decision
by an 'agency or instrumentality' to perform a commercial transaction or act," and the
commercial actions of remote subsidiaries in the United States could not satisfy this re-
quirement in the absence of any evidence of abuse of the corporate form. 37 The court also
required plaintiffs to "specifically allege" (rather than rely on mere inferences) that expro-
priated property is either currently owned or operated by the foreign state, or that subject
property is derived from expropriated property.3 8
4. The Tortious Act Exception
In O'Bryan v. Holy See, the Sixth Circuit joined the Second and D.C. Circuits in finding
that the "entire tort must occur in the United States" for the tortious act exception to
apply.39 The plaintiffs' claims against the Holy See employees, premised upon their negli-
gent supervision in the United States of the clergy allegedly committing acts of abuse, met
this standard, and also were not barred by Subsection 1605(a)(5)(A) of the FSIA. This
subsection precludes claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function."40 In its review of the individual negligence
claims, the Court found that those based on failure to warn and failure to report survived,
but the one based on failure to provide safe care amounted to a claim of negligent hiring,
placing it within the discretionary function exclusion.4'
By contrast, in Doe v. Holy See, the Ninth Circuit found that the negligent retention,
supervision, and failure to warn claims were all barred by the discretionary function exclu-
sion of 1605(a)(5)(A), because plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of any specific
Holy See policy limiting discretion, and also because the hiring, supervision, training, and
decision to warn of employees were discretionary acts protected by the statutory
exclusion.42
35. Cassirer, 580 F.3d at 1056.
36. Id. at 1052. Another notable aspect of the Cassirer decision is the Ninth Circuit's finding that, although
there is no absolute requirement for exhaustion of foreign remedies before invoking a U.S. court's jurisdic-
tion under the FSIA, where "principles of international comity and rules of customary international law
require exhaustion," the district court must conduct a "prudential exhaustion analysis." Id. at 1062 (citing
framework established in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 832-33 (9th Cit. 2008)).
37. Freund v. Republic of France, 592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
38. Id. at 560.
39. O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 382 (6th Cir. 2009).
40. Id. at 385-87.
41. Id. at 387.
42. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2009).
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5. The Terrorism Exception
The most significant decision in 2009 under the new Section 1605A is In re Islamic
Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation.43 As a matter of first impression, the District Court
for the District of Columbia examined the constitutionality of Section 1083(c) of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), which authorizes individ-
uals who had obtained final judgments under Section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA to file new
actions under Section 1605A if they are related to currently pending actions, and found
that it does not call for the reopening of final judgments in contravention of Article III of
the Constitution, because the newly created federal cause of action "allow[s] for new ac-
tions that simply were not available" before the enactment.4 The court further held that
the legislative abrogation of the defenses of resjudicata and collateral estoppel in Section
1083(c)(3)(B) of the NDAA likewise did not contravene Article m of the Constitution.45
The Court then addressed several other issues regarding the Section 1605A claims.
With respect to the determination of substantive tort law governing such claims, the
Court stated that it would "rely on well-established principles of law, such as those found
in Restatement (Second) of Torts and other leading treatises, as well as those principles
that have been adopted by the majority of state jurisdictions."46 With respect to service of
process, the Court held that Section 1608 of the FSIA did not require service of new
federal claims in actions already pending under the old Section 1605(a)(7) that had since
been converted to actions under Section 1605A, because such converted actions need not
be considered as new claims for purposes of the pleading requirements.47
6. Counterclaims Against a Foreign State
In Reino de Espadia v. ABSG Consulting, Inc., the Second Circuit found that the defen-
dant's counterclaims for indemnity and contributory negligence bore a "logical relation-
ship" to Spain's claims against the defendant arising from an oil spill, and raised "similar,
if not identical, issues of duty and causation," so that it was "sensible, as a matter of fair-
ness and judicial efficiency, to adjudicate them in tandem with Spain's claims."48 The
Court found this result to be in accord with the purpose of Section 1607(b) of the FSIA,
which was "to prevent a foreign sovereign from obtaining the benefit of litigating its
43. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 2009 W%7L 3112136, *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2009)
(considering consolidated actions by over one thousand individual plaintiffs).
44. Id. at *36 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) and concluding that Section 1605A is "fundamentally different"
from former Section 1605(a)(7)); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338-344 (2008).
45. Id. at *42-44 (resjudicata was inapplicable to the consolidated cases because the claims under § 1605A
could not have been raised under § 1605(a)(7); collateral estoppels was also precluded because the controlling
legal principals had changed.).
46. Id. at *22 (for more guidance regarding these principles and their application in § 1605A actions, the
court cited its separate opinion in Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2009 WL 3112827, *1 (D.D.C.
Sept. 30, 2009), issued the same day); see also Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (analyzing the choice-of-law rules applicable in an action under the old §1605(a)(7)).
47. In re Iran Terrorism Litig., 2009 WL 3112136, at *65-66 (despite this holding, the court noted that
counsel in § 1605A cases would be well advised to take a conservative approach and serve Iran with the new
claims).
48. Reino de Espaila v. ABSG Consulting, Inc., 334 F. App'x. 383, 2009 WL 1636122, at *2 (C.A.2 (N.Y.).
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claims in a U.S. court while simultaneously avoiding liability for counterclaims logically
related to them."49
D. EXCEPTIONS TO IMMUNITY FROM EXECUTION
In Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit confirmed
that the Section 1610(a) analysis of whether "property in the United States of a foreign
state" is "used for a commercial activity in the United States" must be undertaken as of the
time of the attempted attachment or execution.50 The court found that the statute fore-
closed consideration of the use of property before it became property of the foreign state,
or of potential or future uses of the property.s' Thus, where the property had been at-
tached immediately upon the adoption by the foreign state of a law transferring legal
control of that property from private corporations to a state entity, neither the state entity
nor the foreign state had any opportunity to use the property for a commercial activity in
the United States; the mere transfer of legal control did not qualify property as being
"used for a commercial activity." 52
In Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the District Court for the District of Columbia
stated in dicta that FSIA Section 1610(g), establishing special execution rules applicable to
property of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, does not lift the immunity long accorded
to diplomatic properties.53
II. Service of Process Abroadt
International service of process was again a topic of significant discussion in 2009. Al-
though service of process for a domestic corporation is generally straightforward, interna-
tional service of process is not so clear cut.
International service of process is governed by Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allows service outside the United States "by any internationally agreed
means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by
the Hague Convention." 4 In Volkswagenwerk Akteingesellschaft v. Schlunk, the Supreme
Court held that when service of process is to be made in a foreign country that is a signa-
tory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments (Hague Convention), Rule 4(f) requires that the Hague Convention's provisions are
the exclusive means to effectuate process.55
49. Id.
50. Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2009). The authors' firm repre-
sented the Republic of Argentina in this action.
51. Id.
52. Id.; accord Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic
Def. Sys., 495 F.3d 1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd on other ground, Ministry of Def. & Support for the
Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 129 U.S. S. Ct. 1732, 1738-40 (2009).
53. Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 604 F. Supp. 2d 152, 170 (D.D.C. 2009).
t Contributed by William Lawrence, partner at Frommer, Lawrence & Haug, LLP, New York, New
York.
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(0(1).
55. Volkswagenwerk Akteingesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
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A. ALTERNATIVE SERVICE
One of the most litigated issues arising out of international service of process in 2009 is
whether alternative methods of service under Rule 4(f)(3) would be allowed and the forms
those methods may take. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(0(3) allows for service "by
other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders."56
Because Rule 4(0(3) uses "as the court orders," prior court approval is required. And
International Raelian Movement v. Hashem highlights the need to seek court permission
before attempting any alternative service of process under Rule 4(0(3).s7 The plaintiff in
that case had attempted to serve defendants in Egypt by conventional means. When those
attempts proved unsuccessful, plaintiff sent electronic copies to various e-mail addresses
associated with the defendants, as well as hard copies to the physical address associated
with the defendants' website.58 Noting that the plaintiff was required to get prior ap-
proval, the Court rejected retroactive approval of the plaintiffs methods. But the Court
did recognize that service of process was likely unavailable through traditional means, and
thus granted the plaintiffs approval to re-serve the defendants using those alternative
methods of service. 59
Besides prior court approval, Rule 4(0(3) is only applicable by means not prohibited by
an international agreement, such as the Hague Convention. In In re South African
Apartheid Litigation, the plaintiffs attempted to serve a German defendant using Ger-
many's Central Authority.60 Germany objected to service by judicial agent, mail, or by
diplomat, leaving Germany's Central Authority as the only available means. 61 For reasons
that are unclear, the Central Authority in Germany failed to serve the defendants after six
years.62 The plaintiff, thus, sought alternative service. But the Court was faced with a
difficult fact: Germany had explicitly objected to service via mail, judicial agent, or diplo-
mat.63 To overcome this, the Court noted that while Germany objected to those methods,
it did not expressly forbid numerous other potential avenues and that the Court need only
select one reliable mechanism.64 The court's choice was simple: serve the defendant's
counsel.
Along with the two enumerated provisions-not prohibited by international agreement
and prior court authorization-the courts have maintained that to comply with the Due
Process Clause, any service under Rule 4()(3) must be reasonably calculated to notify the
opposing party of the action. 65 But outside of that general Due Process consideration, the
courts have wide latitude to permit any method of service, as the following cases illustrate.
In a similar fashion to the South African Apartheid court, the court in In re: TFT-LCD
(Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation approved service of process on Taiwanese defendants
56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(0(3).
57. Int'l Raelian Movement v. Hashem, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60542, at *9-12 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2009).
58. Id. at *ll.
59. Id. at *14-16.
60. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 642 F. Supp. 2d 423, 426-27 (2009).
61. Id. at 432.
62. Id. at 437.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93448, *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6,
2009).
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through their U.S. counsel. 66 "Taiwan is not a signatory to the Hague Convention," so
the plaintiff was forced to use other means, such as the letters rogatory process.67 But that
process is both time consuming and costly. Recognizing the cost and time factors, the
Court granted the plaintiffs motion to serve the Taiwanese defendants' U.S. counsel,
which had made filings and appearances on those defendants' behalf. The court reasoned
that under such circumstances, it was reasonable to infer that the Taiwanese defendants
have sufficient notice of the case and service would comply with the Due Process clause.68
But service through U.S. counsel is not the only other means available. In some cases,
electronic service to the defendants e-mail address was allowed. For example, in United
States v. Machat, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motions for alternative service via e-
mail.69 The rationale here was that the plaintiff-in this case, the U.S. government-
could not effect service through the Hague Convention because it was unable to find the
defendant's actual address, although it was believed the defendant was located somewhere
in London, England. In California Board Sports, Inc. v. G.H. Dqkmans Beheer B. V, a Cali-
fornia district court was similarly faced with a plaintiff seeking to serve a Dutch company's
counsel in Missouri by e-mail. 70 In this case, the plaintiffs argument was that it would
take several months to effect service in the Netherlands by using international registered
mail, and that service may be too slow to defeat the defendant's attempt to litigate the
dispute in Missouri as opposed to California.71 But this argument was unavailing because
it was the plaintiffs own fault that it waited to start its service efforts.72 Thus, according
to the Court, the circumstances did not necessitate the court's intervention.
Not all courts, however, view service of process via e-mail to be legitimate. In Mapping
Your Future, Inc. v. Mapping Your Future Services, Ltd., a South Dakota district court was
presented with a similar situation to that in Machat.73 Here, the plaintiff moved for au-
thorization for alternative service via e-mail under Rule 4(0(3), but unfortunately for the
plaintiff, they were in the Eighth Circuit, and under Eighth Circuit law, service of process
by mail is not allowable under the Hague Convention.74 Reasoning that because Rule
4(0(3) only allows service not prohibited by international agreement, and that the Eighth
Circuit has held that the Hague Convention does not permit service via mail, the Court
concluded that sending a summons and complaint via e-mail was not allowed. 75
The Mapping Your Future case highlights two important aspects of service of process
analysis. First, there is still not uniform agreement on the contours of the Hague Conven-
tion. The Eighth Circuit has taken the view that Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention
does not allow service via registered mail. 76 But that line of reasoning is not in the major-
66. Id. at *11.
67. Id. at *9.
68. Id. at *15.
69. United States v. Machat, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87000, *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2009).
70. Cal. Board Sports, Inc. v. G.H. Dijkmans Beheer BY., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97641, *1 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 21, 2009).
71. Id. at *2-4.
72. Id.
73. Mapping Your Future, Inc. v. Mapping Your Future Servs., Ltd., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87571, (D.
S.D. Sept. 23, 2009).
74. Id. at *5-7.
75. Id. at *9.
76. Id.
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ity. For example, in Xyrous Communications, LLC v. Bulgarian Telecommunications Co., a
district court in Virginia held that "service by mail on a party in a foreign country is
appropriate only if the country of designation does not object to Article 10."77 Similarly,
in McKenzie v. Hero Industries, a district court in Arizona found service of process by regis-
tered mail sufficient because "[a]lthough the Hague Convention does not expressly pro-
vide for service by mail, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that service by certified mail is
not excluded by the Convention." 78 And the court presented a similar analysis in the
South African Apartheid case when the court noted that Germany had explicitly rejected
service by mail as a viable option.
The second aspect highlighted in Mapping Your Future is that the divergent views on the
Hague Convention affect more than just how to proceed via the Hague Convention. If a
court takes a restrictive view of the provisions of the Hague Convention, it can affect
possible alternative methods of service of process. By concluding that service of process
through registered mail is not an option available under the Hague Convention, the
Eighth Circuit has eliminated e-mail as a possible option under Rule 4(0(3).
B. RussIA AND THE HAGUE CONVENTION
This past year has also seen courts disagree on how to deal with countries that suspend
judicial cooperation. As described above, in the South African Apartheid case, the district
court granted alternative service of process because the Central Authority in Germany
responsible for serving the defendant inexplicably had not done so in over six years.
Germany was not the only uncooperative county. In In re Potash Antitrust Litigation,
the plaintiff sought alternative means to serve defendants living in Russia.79 The plaintiffs
sought permission for alternative service because Russia had unilaterally suspended all
judicial cooperation with the United States, even though it was a signatory to the Hague
Convention. Reasoning that service in such a circumstance was unavailable, the Court
granted permission to serve by several alternative methods: (1) e-mail to corporate head-
quarters; (2) fax to corporate headquarters; and (3) delivery to two purported agents.80
But the district court in Nuance Communications, Inc. v. Abyy Software House came to a
different conclusion. 8' In that case, the plaintiff admitted to not following the Hague
Convention but instead asserted that the Hague Convention was inapplicable because the
Russian Federation unilaterally suspended all judicial cooperation. 82 The district court,
however, rejected this argument because "[t]here is no authority for this proposition and
nothing before the Court indicates that the Hague Convention is not the proper vehicle
for service of the foreign defendants in this matter."83 This is a markedly different result
from the Potash Antitrust case. Both involved Russian defendants and both plaintiffs as-
serted that the Hague Convention was rendered inoperable by Russia's unilateral suspen-
77. Xyrous Commc'n, LLC v. Bulgarian Telecomm. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80620, *30 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 4, 2009).
78. McKenzie v. Hero Indus., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67932, *15 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2009).
79. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 2009 U.S. Lexis 102623, *50 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2009).
80. Id. at *49-50.
81. Nuance Commc'n, Inc. v. Abby Software House, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75583 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25,
2009).
82. Id. at *10-11.
83. Id. at *11.
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sion of judicial cooperation. So, why the different outcomes? In Potash Antitrust, the
plaintiff offered evidence to support its contention, such as documentation of conversa-
tions with the U.S. Department of State's Legal Office.84 The district court in Nuance,
however, mentioned that there was no support for that proposition. It is possible the
plaintiff in Nuance did not offer up enough credible evidence.
As demonstrated, courts have disagreed on whether service via e-mail is acceptable or
whether circumventing the Hague Convention is acceptable when the defendants are Rus-
sian. But there are also other pitfalls besides those two that plaintiffs and defendants need
to be aware of in this area.
In Smallwood v. Allied Pickfords, LLC, Allied Pickfords challenged service of process in
the United Arab Emirates because the plaintiff did not use the proper diplomatic chan-
nels.85 Interestingly, Allied Pickfords did not assert that it did not receive actual notice or
was prejudiced, but instead claimed that the plaintiff failed to comply with UAE law,
which the plaintiff did not dispute.86 Relying on Rule 4(f)(2)(A)'s specific requirement
that the foreign jurisdiction's local law be followed, the Court found service to be insuffi-
cient. But because the defendant did not claim any prejudice, the Court merely quashed
service and ordered the plaintiff to effect service within sixty days.87
So here there are two lessons-one for the plaintiff and one for the defendant. First,
plaintiffs need to be aware of the law of the foreign jurisdiction in which they are serving
process. Second, defendants challenging service of process need to show some prejudice
or risk having the court quash the summons instead of dismissing the case.
III. Personal Jurisdictiont
With the exception of a few decisions in the Federal Circuit, federal personal jurisdic-
tion jurisprudence was unremarkable this year.8 In late 2008, the Federal Circuit de-
clined to extend personal jurisdiction in a suit for declaratory judgment of non-
infringement and invalidity of a foreign company's two American patents because the
company had not purposefully directed its activities in the forum beyond sending letters
84. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 2009 U.S. Lexis 102623 at *54 n. 20.
85. Smallwood v. Allied Pickfords, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91141, *37 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009).
86. Id. at *38-39.
87. Id. at *39-42.
t Jarrett B. Perlow, Legal Adviser, United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The views
expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the court or the United States Government.
88. As an example, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Consdring Engineers Carp. v. Geometric Ltd. provides a
concise overview of how to analysis a question of federal personal jurisdiction. See Consulting Eng'rs Corp. v.
Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273,277-79(4th Cir. 2009). Three other cases may also be of interest. D'Jamoos
v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that Swiss aircraft manufacture has
purposefully directed its activities in the forum by targeting itself to the United States market by complying
with Federal Aviation Administration standards); Oldfield v. Pueblo de Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210 (1lth
Cir. 2009) (finding no specific personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) analysis and setting aside a default
judgment in a suit against a Costa Rica resort for injuries from a boating accident); CFA Inst. v. Inst. of
Chartered Fin. Analysts of India, 551 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2009) (extending personal jurisdiction in trademark
infringement and unfair competition suit against Indian licensing association under the Virginia long-arm
statute and not, as the district court found, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) because the associa-
tion engaged in a "substantial business relationship" and "purposefully transacted business" with the plaintiff
in Virginia).
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suggesting patent infringement.89 Five months later, the Federal Circuit clarified the ex-
tent of its decision. This new case, Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Technology Ltd,90 is
discussed first, followed by a second patent infringement case. A final Alien Tort Claims
Act case from the Ninth Circuit looks at jurisdiction and agency law following that court's
2001 Unocal decision.91
A. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS
Autogenomics, a Californian biotechnology company filed federal suit in the Central
District of California against Oxford Gene Technology, a British biotechnology company,
for declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability of a por-
tion of Oxford's American patent related to analyzing DNA sequences. 92 Having con-
cluded Oxford was not subject to general personal jurisdiction in the forum, the Court
turned to whether specific personal jurisdiction applied by evaluating whether Oxford
"purposefully directed its activities" at the forum.9 3 The court reiterated that in Avocet it
limited these activities to "only enforcement or defense efforts related to the patent rather
than the patentee's own commercialization efforts" in a declaratory judgment suit. 94
While the Court was "concerned that foreign patentees like Oxford may engage in signifi-
cant commercialization and licensing efforts in a state while benefiting from the shelter of
the Avocent rule,"9 5 California lacked specific jurisdiction over Oxford because its' only
alleged patent-related activities in the forum involved sending cease-and-desist letters to
Autogenomics. 9 6 The court affirmed the lower coiurt's dismissal for lack of general or
specific jurisdiction.9 7
89. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see id. at 1336 ("In
short, a defendant patentee's mere acts of making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing products-
whether covered by the relevant patent(s) or not-do not, in the jurisdictional sense, relate in any material way
to the patent right that is at the center of any declaratory judgment claim for non-infringement, invalidity,
and/or unenforceability. Thus, we hold that such sales do not constitute such 'other activities' as will support
a claim of specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant patentee. While such activities may in the aggregate
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over the patentee, they do not establish a basis for specific jurisdic-
tion in this context.") (emphasis and citations omitted).
90. Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
91. Bauman v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248
F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
92. Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1014 ("oligonucleotide microarrays for analysis of polynucleotides"). For
more information, see U.S. Patent No. 6,054,270 (issued Apr. 25, 2000).
93. Id. at 1018 (finding no evidence of continuous and systemic contacts in California from Oxford's at-
tendance at several conferences in the state, Oxford's collaborative agreement with a separate company with
California offices, and one percent of sales revenue from California in 2006-unrelated to the patent at issue
in this case).
94. Id. at 1020 ("[Tlhe relevant activities are those that the defendant 'purposefully directs ... at the forum
which relate in some material way to the enforcement of the defense of the patent'") (quoting Avocent, 552
F.3d at 1336) (omission in original).
95. Id. at 1021 (rejecting the dissent's contention that foreign patents are "immunized from adjudication"
because 35 U.S.C. § 293 places jurisdiction over foreign patents in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia).
96. Id. (concluding Autogenomics failed to "allege sufficient activities 'relat[ing] to the validity and enforce-
ability of the patent"') (quoting Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1336) (edit in original).
97. Id. at 1024 (finding the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Autogenomic's request for jurisdic-
tional discovery). But see id. at 1024-28 (Newman, J., dissenting) (disagreeing on the jurisdictional issue).
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Before Autogenomics, the Federal Circuit considered the extent to which Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) applies in patent infringement cases.98 Synthes, a medical-device
company based in Pennsylvania, filed a patent infringement suit against GMReis, a Brazil-
ian medical-device corporation.99 Synthes alleged infringement based on GMReis's at-
tendance and participation in a 2007 trade show. 00 In evaluating Rule 4(k)(2), the Court
found that the case arose under federal law, that personal jurisdiction was appropriate
because GMReis purposely promoted its products at a trade show in the United States,
and that jurisdiction over GMReis would be "both reasonable and fair."' 0 Having con-
cluded GMReis was subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States, the Court re-
versed and remanded the case to the district court.102
The Federal Circuit reconciled its decision with Synthes in a brief footnote in Autoge-
nomics: "Synthes was not a declaratory judgment action against the patent holder but rather
an infringement suit brought by the patentee against an accused infringer, where commer-
cialization-type contacts are highly relevant to personal jurisdiction." 0 3 For now, it ap-
pears Avocent is limited to declaratory judgment actions only.
B. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Several Argentineans brought suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act, alleging their for-
mer employer, Mercedes Benz Argentina, conspired and colluded with the former Argen-
tine military government to root out subversive employees.10 4 The plaintiffs named
DaimlerChrysler AG, a German company, as the sole defendant and argued Daimler-
Chrysler was subject to personal jurisdiction through its relationship with its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Mercedes Benz U.S.A., L.L.C., which was responsible for marketing
and distributing DaimlerChrysler's vehicles in California.105
Under its decision in Unocal, a subsidiary's contacts may be imputed to a parent organi-
zation if the subsidiary "perform [s] services 'sufficiently important to the [parent] corpora-
tion that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the [parent] . . . would
undertake to perform substantively similar services." 06 But if the business relationship is
simply a matter of investment, then the subsidiary is not an agent. 0 7 While not deviating
98. See Synthes v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[W]e
have not yet had occasion to analyze the applicability of Rule 4(k)(2)"); Id. at 1293 ("[Wge have not yet had
occasion to analyze the applicability of Rule 4(k)(2)").
99. Id. at 1287-88.
100. Id. at 1288.
101. Id. at 1299-30.
102. Id. at 1300.
103. Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1020 n.1 ("By contrast, in Avocent we held that '[w]hat the patentee makes,
uses, offers to sell, sells, or imports is of no real relevance to the enforcement or defense of a patent.'") (edit in
original, internal citation omitted). In his Autogenomic dissent, Judge Newman believed these cases were
incompatible, and the distinction between a foreign party being an accused infringer (GMReis) and a patentee
(Oxford) had been previously rejected by the court. See id. at 1026-27 (citing Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-
Import Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
104. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1091.
105. Id. at 1092, 1094.
106. Id. at 1094-95 (quoting subsequent cases applying Unocal).
107. Id. at 1095. The court reiterated that "'[alppropriate parental involvement includes: monitoring of the
subsidiary's performance, supervision of the subsidiary's finance and capital budget decisions, and articulation
of general policies and procedures.'" Id. (quoting Unocal, 248 F.3d at 926).
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from its position in Unocal, the Court clarified that Unocal did not remove the requirement
for the principal to exercise "pervasive and continual control" over the agent in the case of
agency-based jurisdiction.108
Applying Unocal to the facts of Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, the Court found
DaimlerChrysler did not exercise pervasive and continual control over Mercedes Benz
USA because the agreement between the companies was terminable, Mercedes Benz's
sales goals were negotiated between the parties, and Mercedes Benz could decide not to
buy and market DaimlerChrysler's product in California.109 Yet even if DaimlerChrysler
exercised sufficient control, Mercedes Benz did not function as DaimlerChrysler's repre-
sentative: the plaintiffs failed to show that DaimlerChrysler "would undertake to perform
substantially similar services in the absence" of Mercedes Benz."10 Because Mercedes
Benz did not meet the standard for agency in Unocal, its contacts "could not be imputed"
to DaimlerChrysler,1I" and absent this relationship with Mercedes Benz, DaimlerChrysler
lacked "continuous and systemic contacts sufficient to confer general jurisdiction,"ll 2 and
therefore the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal." 3
IV. The Act of State Doctrinet
A. INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of judicial review," 4
and reflects judicial reluctance to interfere in matters of foreign relations more appropri-
ately left to other branches of government.115 Applying the doctrine, U.S. courts will
avoid reviewing cases or controversies that require passing judgment on the validity of the
official acts of a foreign State performed in its own territory."'
B. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DISTINGUISHED FROM FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
COMPULSION AND INTERNATIONAL CoMTrrY DOCTRINES
In In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, in which plaintiffs allege price fixing and supply
restrictions in violation of the Clayton and Sherman Acts, defendant companies moved to
dismiss on the basis that the act of state, international comity, and foreign sovereign com-
pulsion doctrines barred the suit because the Chinese government compelled defendants'
actions."l 7 Developing evidence not in the complaint, defendants argued that the Chinese
Ministry of Commerce mandated their membership in a government-sponsored commit-
108. Id. at 1095.
109. Id. at 1096.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1097.
112. Id.; but see id. at 1098-1106 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1098 (majority opinion).
t Submitted by Matthew D. Slater, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP in Washington,
D.C., with assistance from Lee F. Berger and Kish Vinayagamoorthy, both associates at the same firm.
114. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964); Credit Suisse v. United
States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1997).
115. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1992).
116. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 399; Credit Suisse, 130 F.3d at 1346.
117. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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tee, which strictly controlled vitamin C production and set and enforced export prices.is
Plaintiffs responded that the defendants' actions were purely voluntary, pointing out that
the defendants had failed to identify any particular laws or regulations requiring the con-
duct and noting that price and volume restrictions only arose after defendants achieved
market power.' 19
In its analysis, the district court distinguished the three doctrines, clarifying that "the
act of state doctrine is aimed at reserving for the executive branch decisions that may
significantly affect international relations"l 20 and ensuring that "any censure of another
country's acts within its own territory is reserved to diplomatic channels and does not
come within the purview of the courts."121 By contrast, the foreign sovereign compulsion
doctrine:
focuses on the plight of a defendant who is subject to conflicting legal obligations
under two sovereign states. Rather than being concerned with the diplomatic impli-
cations of condemning another country's official acts, the foreign sovereign compul-
sion doctrine recognizes that a defendant trying to do business under conflicting legal
regimes may be caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place where compli-
ance with one country's laws results in violation of another's.122
Last, international comity applies only when there is a "true conflict between domestic
and foreign law."l 23 Because the parties disputed the issue of government compulsion and
the factual record was insufficient on this point, the Court rejected defendants' motion to
dismiss, waiting for further factual development regarding the extent to which the alleged
price-fixing occurred as a matter of Chinese law or at the Chinese government's
instruction.124
C. CRIMES AGAINST HuMANYry Do NOT IMPLICATE THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
In Lizarbe v. Rondon,12s the District Court for Maryland denied act-of-state dismissal of
a suit under the Torture Victim Protection Act and Alien Tort Claims Act alleging that the
defendant engaged in crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and extra-judicial kill-
ings while he was a member of the Peruvian Army.126 The court relied on three grounds.
First, because the acts were "committed in violation of the norms of customary interna-
tional law, [they] are not deemed official acts for the purposes of the acts [sic] of state
118. Id. at 553-54. Although the opinion discusses numerous state and quasi-state entities, the Ministry
allegedly controls them all. Id.
119. Id. at 554.
120. Id. at 550.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 551.
123. Id. at 552 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993)).
124. Id. at 559. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce submitted an amicus brief explaining that defendants
were required to agree on a price for exports of vitamin C and every defendant had to abide by the agreed
upon price. Id. at 554. Although the court accorded the brief "substantial deference," it did not take it as
"conclusive evidence of compulsion." Id. at 557. The Court noted what it perceived to be a lack of trans-
parency in Chinese law, and confusion as to when the defendants and the government acted. Id. at 559.
125. Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D. Md. 2009).
126. Id. at 477-78.
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doctrine," 27 a conclusion the Court considered confirmed by language in a U.S. Senate
report concerning the Torture Victim Protection Act.128 Second, there was little risk that
adjudication would cause international friction because both the U.S. and current Peru-
vian governments expressly condemned the acts alleged, and the current Peruvian govern-
ment denied that they were acts of state.129 Third, the Court found that a change of
regime in Peru since the alleged acts occurred makes them "less likely to implicate the act
of state doctrine." 30
D. NATURE OF A SOVEREIGN AcT QUALIFYING FOR APPLICATION OF ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE
In In re Refined Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, plaintiffs sought relief under fed-
eral antitrust laws, alleging that defendant companies assisted an antitrust conspiracy
among sovereign nations, including those within OPEC, to limit the production (and raise
the price) of crude oil.131 Defendants moved to dismiss on act of state grounds, among
others.
In response, the Southern District of Texas followed a familiar analysis, placing the
burden of proving the applicability of the act of state doctrine on the party wishing to
invoke it.132 To apply, a party's claim must concern the validityi13 of a governmental act
that a recognized sovereign performs within its own borders.'34 If so, the doctrine's pred-
icate is satisfied, even if the defendants are private parties and not governmental actors.135
Nevertheless, the court must evaluate whether the doctrine's application would further its
purpose and whether any exceptions exist.' 36
The court held that the act of state doctrine applied to bar the action because, at their
core, the plaintiffs' antitrust claims concerned sovereign decisions about exploitation of
the States' natural resources, and these decisions are "sovereign acts regardless of whether
the decisions are products of unilateral deliberations or consultations with others." 37 Al-
though the plaintiffs focused attention on the defendant companies' actions alleged to
further the States' conspiracy, the Court concluded that defendants' actions alone could
not have violated the law absent an illegal conspiracy among the States.13s The court thus
127. Id. at 488. The court also explained that "actions of military officers are not ipso facto acts of state." Id.
Moreover, the doctrine "does not call for abstention merely because a case may require the acts of a former
foreign government official to be judged." Id.
128. Id. at 488-89.
129. Id. at 489.
130. Id. The court reaffirmed each of these grounds in denying defendant's motion for certification for
interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See Lizarbe v. Rondon, No. PJM 07-1809, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70647 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2009).
131. In re Refined Petroleum Prod, Antitrust Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 572, 575-76 (S.D. Tex. 2009). This
decision is currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The author submitted a
brief for the United Mexican States as amicus curiae in both the trial and appellate courts.
132. Id. at 583-85.
133. Id. at 588.
134. Id. at 582.
135. Id. at 589.
136. Id. at 584.
137. Id. at 588.
138. Id. at 589.
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stressed the importance of examining the full context to assess whether the lawsuit
presents a risk of declaring invalid a sovereign nation's actions.
Without deciding the existence of a commercial activity exception to the act of state
doctrine, the Court declined to apply it in this case because the central alleged acts con-
cerned sovereign decisions regarding natural resource production levels, not commercial
activity.' 39 The court also declined to apply a strict territorial limitation to the doctrine
based on allegations that the sovereign nations may have agreed on production levels in
meetings outside their own territorial boundaries because their decisions concerned sover-
eign matters applicable within their borders.140 The court also found that the doctrine's
application would further its purpose because of (1) the low degree of consensus concern-
ing antitrust matters in international law, (2) significant implications of this issue for
United States foreign relations, and (3) the continued existence of governmental regimes
whose acts were challenged.141
In In re Petition to Vacate an Adoption Decree, in the adoption ofJohn Doe, Adoptee, the New
York Appellate Division's First Department declined to apply the act of state doctrine to
Cambodian government statements purporting to resolve an adoption dispute between
U.S. citizens domiciled in New York regarding a Cambodian child domiciled in New
York. 142 The Court questioned whether the doctrine applies other than to public acts of
general applicability, whereas "an adoption can be characterized as an administrative act
which essentially involves a matter of private interests."l 43 The Court did not rest on this
ground, but rather concluded that the government statements were not acts of state be-
cause they merely characterized prior government acts and applied them to the disputed
matters in New York.144 Moreover, the territorial limitation precluded the doctrine's ap-
plicability because:
The doctrine's territorial limitation requires that the doctrine apply to acts done by a
foreign state within its own territory and applicable there. . . . A foreign government's
act is not 'done' or 'committed' or 'taken' within its own territory simply because the
government officials responsible for the act were physically located within that na-
tion's boundaries at the time when they acted. Rather, the doctrine applies only
when the subject matter of the act is located within the geographical boundaries of
the foreign state.t45
Because the child and the parties were all located in New York, the Court found that the
matter fell more appropriately within New York's, rather than Cambodia's jurisdiction.
139. Id. at 595-96.
140. Id. at 594.
141. Id. at 592.
142. In re Petition to Vacate an Adoption Decree, in the adoption of John Doe, Adoptee, 868 N.Y.S.2d 40
(1st Dept. 2008).
143. Id. at 46.
144. Id. at 47.
145. Id. at 48 (citations omitted). The court found potential exceptions inapplicable because the acts in
question would have effect, if at all, only outside Cambodia. See id.
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E. DETERMINING WHETIIER SOVEREIGN ACTS ARE IMPLICATED
In Interspan Distribution Corporation. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters Inc., the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas denied an act of state doctrine motion because, although the complaint
involved putative government conduct, the court could adjudicate the complaint without
addressing the validity of any government act.'46 Interspan claimed that Uzbekistan's ar-
rest of its employee and a principal's family member conveyed a threat that their safety
would be in danger unless Interspan relinquished its business and assets in Uzbekistan.147
Interspan then sought to recover its losses under a previously issued Liberty insurance
policy that provided coverage for extortion.148 Liberty sought to invoke the act of state
doctrine by arguing that the court could not decide the coverage issue without calling into
question the validity of Uzbekistan's arrest of persons connected to Interspan.149 The
court agreed with Interspan that the act of state doctrine was not implicated because "[t]he
sole focus of the inquiry is whether Interspan had an objectively reasonable belief that it
was faced with a covered threat when it decided to give up its business interests and assets
in Uzbekistan."15o
In United States v. Portrait of Wally, the Southern District of New York declined to apply
the state action doctrine to a dispute regarding ownership of a painting.' 5' Egon Schiele's
"Portrait of Wally" (Wally) was owned by a Jewish art collector, but she was forced to
relinquish it to flee Nazi persecution.152 The artwork went through a number of hands
and a series of approvals by various Austrian ministries before it finally became the prop-
erty of the Leopold Museum. 5 3 When the Leopold Museum shipped the painting to the
United States for display, the estate of Wally's original owner and the U.S. government
moved to have it seized as stolen property under the National Stolen Property Act.154
The Leopold Museum argued that the act of state doctrine applied because the court
would have to consider the validity of various Austrian government approvals of the trans-
fers of Wally's possession. 55 In rejecting the Museum's argument, the Court concluded
that its adjudication did not risk declaring invalid any actions taken by the Austrian gov-
ernment, but rather would only determine the effect, if any, of such actions on the owner-
ship of the painting.156 Moreover, the court found little risk of interference with the
conduct of foreign relations, noting that the U.S. Executive Branch itself sought the adju-
dication, and "Austrian law favors restoration of ownership." 57
146. Interspan Distrib. Corp. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., No. H-07-1078, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74236, at *114 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2009).
147. Id. at *75.
148. Id. at *76-77.
149. Id. at *103.
150. Id. at *111-12.
151. United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (LAP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91464, at *34, *39
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009).
152. Id. at *9-10.
153. Id. at *7-31.
154. Id. at *3.
155. Id. at *34-37.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *38.
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F. ACT OF STATE DoCTmNE AND FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Provincial Gov't ofMarinduque v. Placer Dome Inc. was removed from state court to fed-
eral court and sought damages arising from a mining company's alleged pollution in the
Philippines.'58 The basis for removal, sustained by the District Court of Nevada, was that
the act of state doctrine applied and created federal jurisdiction. s9 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that although plaintiff's complaint "is sprinkled with references to the
Philippine government, Philippine law, and the government's complicity,"160 the act of
state doctrine was not implicated because "none of the supposed acts of state ... is essen-
tial to the [plaintiffs] claims"'61 and the "complaint does not require us to pass on the
validity of the Philippines' governmental actions" 62 the validity of many or perhaps all of
which was not disputed.163 The Court found further support because the alleged sover-
eign acts were taken by a previous regime and were therefore unlikely to affect foreign
relations.' 64 Because the complaint did not present a federal question giving rise to fed-
eral jurisdiction, removal was improper, and remand to the state court was required.165
V. International Discoveryt
A. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
In 2009, U.S. federal courts elaborated on earlier jurisprudence concerning the require-
ments for obtaining discovery in the United States for use in foreign proceedings pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Section 1782(a).1 66 Several court decisions analyzed the factors set out by
Section 1782(a) and the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.167 to
determine whether to allow discovery.168 The Eleventh Circuit held in Weber v. Finker
that the scope of discovery under Section 1782(a) is not limited to documents that are
158. Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2009).
159. Id. at 1091. See id. at 1085 (Act of State doctrine can qualify as a basis for federal question jurisdiction
"when the plaintiffs complaint challenges the validity of a foreign state's conduct.").
160. Id. at 1091.
161. Id.




t Contributed by Howard S. Zelbo, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York,
New York, with assistance from Ram Murali, Ann Nee, and Catherine Barnard, associates at the same firm.
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2009) ("The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found
may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."). Id.
167. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
168. In Intel the Supreme Court noted three requirements for invoking section 1782(a): (1) the discovery
must be sought from a person residing in the district of the court to which the application is made; (2) the
discovery must be for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal; and (3) the applicant must be a foreign or
international tribunal or an interested person. The Court also listed several discretionary factors for a court
to consider, including: (1) whether the person for whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign
proceeding, (2) the nature of the proceedings and the "receptivity" of the foreign court to U.S. federal court
assistance; (3) whether the application attempts to circumvent foreign proof gathering restrictions or other
policies of a foreign country; and (4) whether the request is unduly burdensome or intrusive. Id. at 264-65.
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actually to be used in a foreign proceeding. 169 The Court noted that "Section 1782 ex-
pressly provides that the district court should grant discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure," and thus, granting discovery "for context" is permissible when such dis-
covery is allowed under Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.o70 The
Northern District of California adopted a similar interpretation in Cryolife, Inc. v. Tenaxis
Med., Inc.171 The Court emphasized that Section 1782(a) does not require that the party
seeking discovery establish that the requested information would be discoverable in the
foreign jurisdiction or that U.S. law would permit discovery in an analogous domestic
proceeding.172
Other cases focused on the underlying purposes of Section 1782(a) and expressed con-
cern about potential forum shopping by foreign parties. The Southern District of New
York in In re 000 Promnefstroy denied an application for discovery pursuant to Section
1782(a), finding that granting the application would give parties "an incentive, after losing
in their original requests for information in the foreign tribunal, to rush to the United
States in hopes of obtaining a second bite at the apple." 73 Similarly, the Northern Dis-
trict of Indiana in In re Kulzer rejected an application for discovery, stating that Section
1782(a) "is not intended to allow unfettered access to the United States' courts or to en-
courage foreign parties to 'forum shop,' whenever the procedures of their home tribunal
are less favorable to their case."' 74
The controversy continued over the types of tribunals that should be included under
Section 1782(a). In the past, some U.S. courts have held that private commercial arbitral
bodies do not fall within the scope of tribunals to which Section 1782(a) applies.175 In the
years following the Supreme Court's decision in Intel, a number of district courts came to
the opposite conclusion.' 76 In 2009, however, several U.S. courts once again held that
private arbitration does not fall within the scope of Section 1782(a). In El Paso Corp. v. La
Comision Ejecutiva, the Fifth Circuit held that Section 1782(a) does not apply to discovery
for use in a private international arbitration.177 The Court noted that the application of
169. Weber v. Finker, 554 F.3d 1379 (11th Cir. 2009).
170. Id. at 1385.
171. Cryolife, Inc. v. Tenaxis Med., No. C08-05124 HRL, 2009 WL 88348, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan 13, 2009)
(not designated for citation).
172. Id. at.*2; See also In re Fischer Advanced Composite Components AG, No. C08-1512 RSM, 2008 WL
5210839, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2008) (nothing in statute or its legislative history includes a "foreign-
discoverability" rule).
173. In re 000 Promnefstroy, No. M 19-99 (RJS), slip op., 2009 WL 3335608, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
2009).
174. In re Kulzer, No. 3:09-MC-08 CAN, 2009 WL 961229, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 8, 2009), affd, 2009 WL
2058718 (N.D. Ind. July 9, 2009).
175. See, e.g., National Broad. Co. v. Bear Steams & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
"tribunals" under §1782(a) are limited to government bodies); see also Republic of Kazakstan v. Biedermann
Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999).
176. See, e.g., In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating private commer-
cial arbitral bodies are included in scope of 1782(a)); In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957
(D. Minn. 2007) (stating a private arbitral tribunal was a "tribunal" under 1782(a)); In re Ror Trading Ltd.,
469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225-26 (N.D. Ga. 2006) ("Although Intel did not expressly hold arbitral bodies to be
'tribunals,' it quoted approvingly language that included 'arbitral tribunals' within the term's meaning in
§ 1782(a).").
177. El Paso Corp. v. La Comisi6n Ejecutiva, Hidroel6ctrica Del Rio Lempa, No. 08-20771, 2009 WL
2407189, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2009).
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Section 1782(a) to private arbitration was not at issue in Intel.178 The Northern District of
Illinois came to the same conclusion, holding that Section 1782 does not apply to discov-
ery for use in a private arbitration conducted pursuant to arbitration provisions in a rein-
surance policy.' 79 The court interpreted the Intel court's reference to "arbitral tribunals"
as "including state-sponsored arbitral bodies but excluding purely private arbitrations."' 80
Similarly, the Middle District of Florida held that Section 1782(a) "does not authorize
discovery relief in a proceeding such as [private arbitration], which functions as a contrac-
tual alternative to state-sponsored [tribunals]."I81 The District Court for the District of
Connecticut also addressed the types of tribunals that should be included under Section
1782(a) in OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp.1 82 The court held that the arbitra-
tion panel in that case was a "foreign tribunal" within the meaning of Section 1782(a) for
two reasons: first, the Court accepted the argument that it was not a purely private tribu-
nal because the arbitration was governed by the UNCITRAL rules of arbitration and,
second, according to the court, the arbitration award could be reviewed on the merits by a
Swedish court on appeal. 83
Finally in 2009, courts applied Section 1782(a) in the context of family law. In Kwong
Mei Lan Mirana v. Battery Tai-Shing Corp., the Northern District of California granted a
motion to compel production of documents, concluding that information related to a
spouse's share of ownership of companies was relevant to a Hong Kong divorce proceed-
ing.184 Conversely, in In re Marano, the Court denied a discovery application for use in a
British divorce proceeding, where the document requests were "overly broad and unduly
burdensome." 8 5 In another case, In re Letter of Request From Dist. Court Stara Lubovna,
the U.S. government filed an application, pursuant to Section 1782(a), for an order com-
pelling a party to provide a blood or DNA sample to determine the paternity of a minor
child.'1 6 The court granted the application, finding that it satisfied the requirements of
Section 1782(a).' 87
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
In 2009, several U.S. courts applied the discretionary factors in Sociiti Nationale Indus-
trielle Airospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa in evaluating re-
quests for discovery of information located abroad for use in U.S. proceedings.' 88 One
178. Id. at *3.
179. In re Arbitration in London, 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 882 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
180. Id. at 885.
181. In re Operadora DB Mex., No. 6:09-cv-383-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 2423138, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4,
2009).
182. See generally OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., No. 3:09 MC 2650BA), 2009 WL 2877156
(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2009).
183. Id. at *4.
184. See Kwong Mei Lan Mirana v. Battery Tai-Shing Corp., No. C 08-80142 MISC. JF (RS), 2009 WL
290459, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2009).
185. In re Marano, No. CV-09-80020-MISC-DLJ, 2009 WL 482649, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2009).
186. See In re Letter of Request From Dist. Court Stara Lubovna, No. 3:09-MC-20-34 MCR, 2009 WL
3711924, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2009).
187. Id. at *3.
188. See Soci6ti Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522, 539 (1987) (stating the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located
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bankruptcy case, In re Global Power Equip. Group Inc., allowed discovery under the Federal
Rules rather than via the Hague Convention. 189 The debtor in that case sought discovery
from a Dutch company claimant of information held by the claimant's affiliate in
France.190 The Dutch company argued it could not produce the information under
French law except in accordance with the Hague Convention.'9 The Court allowed dis-
covery under the Federal Rules, however, holding that the French interest was "particu-
larly attenuated" where the producing party was not a French national, the discovery was
regarding a project taking place outside France, and the information was mostly developed
outside France.192
In another case, the Southern District of New York conducted a comity analysis using
the factors in Aerospatiale in a situation involving discovery of information not located
abroad.193 The Court granted plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery from a U.S. auditing
firm of documents in the United States generated in an investigation where the U.S. firm
was hired as an expert by French statutory auditors.194 The Court held that, even though
two French courts had determined that French law barred production of the requested
documents, France's interest in enforcing its laws was weaker as to non-nationals in the
United States.' 95 Further, the Court observed that the French statutory auditors' expecta-
tion of maintaining the files' secrecy may not have been reasonable in light of their "pur-
poseful availment" of a U.S. auditing firm.196
In a case concerning discovery requests under the Hague Convention, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas declined to issue a Letter of Request where defendants sought to compel
"broad discovery from an agent or agency of a sovereign nation," which was "not some-
thing [the] court would lightly undertake." 97 Similarly, the Southern District of Florida
held that courts should give "serious consideration to the availability of alternate sources"
abroad); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(l)(c) (1987) (setting out five factors courts
should take into account when deciding whether to issue an order of production of information located
abroad: "[(1)] the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other information requested; [(2)] the
degree of specificity of the request; {(3)] whether the information originated in the United States; [(4)] the
availability of alternative means of securing the information; and [(5)} the extent to which noncompliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine the important interests of the state where the information is located"). Courts in the
Second Circuit also consider "the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is
sought [and] the good faith of the party resisting discovery." See Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs.,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
189. In re Global Power Equip. Group Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 836 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 839.
192. Id. at 849-50; see also Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 09-cv-560 (DMC), 2009 WL
3069651, at *4, *7 (D.NJ. Sept. 24, 2009) (authorizing the U.S.-sited deposition of a foreign party under the
Federal Rules where the deposition was focused on the "crucial threshold issue of jurisdiction" to be decided
"as soon as possible," and the foreign party deponent had waived any objection to such a deposition by
submitting a declaration in support of a motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules).
193. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 335, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
194. Id. at 338, 343.
195. Id. at 341-42.
196. Id.
197. Seoul Semiconductor Co. Ltd. v. Nichia Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 832, 836-37 (E.D. Tex. 2008).
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of evidence and declined to issue Letters of Request where the evidence sought was likely
to yield mostly, if not entirely, duplicative information.198
In the criminal context under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Eastern District of Virginia analyzed the requirements for ordering a foreign deposition
and found that the defendant had not "adequately established that exceptional circum-
stances exist to warrant [the depositions], and so letters rogatory should not issue request-
ing Nigerian judicial officials' assistance in obtaining their depositions."' 9 9 The Court,
however, construed defendant's motion for authorization of depositions as containing a
"lesser included motion" for judicial assistance in obtaining further information relating to
the Rule 15 requirements and issued a Letter Rogatory to request such information. 200
Finally, in a case involving the Walsh Act,201 the Northern District of California
granted the Securities and Exchange Commission's request for a subpoena compelling a
U.S. citizen abroad to attend a deposition in the United States.202 The Court held that
the intended deponent was a critical witness with otherwise unavailable information and
that his physical presence in the United States was necessary to protect the discovery
rights of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which had already in other instances
been "inappropriately thwarted." 203
VI. Extraterritorial Application of United States Lawt
In determining the appropriateness of applying U.S. law extraterritorially, courts look
to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The Restatement
allows a state to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction where the conduct in question "has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory." 204 Courts should consider the
following factors in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is reasonable: (1) the
extent of the domestic effect of the conduct; (2) the connections between the United
States and the persons engaging in the conduct in question; (3) the character of the con-
duct and the extent to which it is regulated elsewhere; (4) whether justified expectations
exist and are protected; (5) the importance of the regulation internationally; (6) consis-
tency with international custom; (7) the interests of other States in regulating the conduct;
198. Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077-CIV, 2009 WL 3823390, at *21 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 16, 2009).
199. United States v. Jefferson, 594 F. Supp. 2d 655, 675 (E.D. Va. 2009).
200. Id.; see also Brake Parts, Inc. v. Lewis, No. 09-132-KSF, 2009 WL 1939039, at *3-4, *6 (E.D. Ky. July 6,
2009) (granting plaintiff's request for a Letter Rogatory against a non-party because the non-party failed to
demonstrate that plaintiffs request ex~eeded the low threshold under the Federal Rules of being likely to lead
to discovery of admissible evidence, and there was no requirement for plaintiff first to seek the requested
discovery from defendant).
201. 28 U.S.CA § 1783(a) (2009) (permitting court to order issuance of a subpoena to American citizen
located outside of the United States where testimony sought "is necessary in the interest of justice" and, in a
non-criminal proceeding, "it is not possible to obtain his testimony in admissible form without his personal
appearance").
202. SEC v. Sabblok, No. C 08-4238 CRB (IL), 2009 WL 3561523, at *1, *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009).
203. Id. at *4.
t Contributed by Karen Woody, attorney at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP.
204. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 (l)(c) (1987).
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and (8) whether the regulation would create a conflict with the laws of a foreign
jurisdiction.205
In the past year, U.S. courts have applied these principles to a wide variety of areas, and
in particular, have considered extraterritoriality in disputes involving criminal statutes and
the Alien Tort Claims Act.
A. CiUiNAL STATUTES
In United States v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, the Southern District of New York held that
the Court lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction over the Swiss branch of a British bank in an
action brought for alleged violations of the Money Laundering Control Act (MILCA).206
Lloyds TSB Bank (the Bank) is organized under the laws of the United Kingdom and
maintained a branch in Geneva, Switzerland. Two individual citizens of Cyprus, both
officers in AremisSoft Corporation, a Delaware corporation, executed a widespread fraud
scheme, resulting in a loss of $500 million to AremisSoft shareholders, using accounts at
the Bank's Geneva branch. 207 The U.S. Attorney brought an action for a civil monetary
remedy against the Bank, asserting that the Bank violated the MLCA. 208 The complaint
alleged that the Bank and one of the AremisSoft officers engaged in transactions to pro-
mote fraud and should be held liable for conspiracy. The Bank argued that the U.S.
Government lacked subject matter jurisdiction to bring an action against it. The Court,
in analyzing whether the Bank was a proper party, noted that Congress expressed its in-
tent for the MLCA to apply extraterritorially in limited circumstances if the conduct at
issue is by a U.S. citizen or occurs in part in the United States. 209 The Court concluded
that the MLCA did not create extraterritorial jurisdiction, and any exercise of that juris-
diction would be unreasonable. 210
In United States v. Martinez, defendant Martinez kidnapped a fifteen-year-old minor in
Texas and took her to Mexico where he engaged in sexual activity with her.211 Martinez
argued that the Western District of Texas lacked jurisdiction because the underlying al-
leged sex acts occurred in Mexico. Martinez challenged the court's jurisdiction over the
charge of "engaging in illicit sexual activity in foreign places," in violation of 18 U.S.C.
Section 2423(c).2 12 The Court disagreed, stating that the legislative authority extends to
conduct by Americans abroad, that both defendant and the victim are American citizens,
and that Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially.213 Martinez argued that
extraterritorial application of the U.S. law was unreasonable because the age of consent in
Mexico is twelve, rather than eighteen. The Court rejected Martinez's argument and held
that Section 2423 withstood scrutiny under the principles of international law and the
reasonableness standard applied to extraterritorial jurisdiction. 214 Specifically, the Court
205. Id. § 403(2).
206. United States v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, 639 F. Supp. 2d 314, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
207. Id. at 315.
208. Id. at 316.
209. Id. at 316-17.
210. Id. at 324.
211. United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790-91 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
212. Id. at 792, 796.
213. Id. at 797, 800.
214. Id.
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stated that the law of Mexico was not relevant given the nationalities of the parties and
that the act in question was not consensual sex, but forced sex, which is also illegal in
Mexico. 215 For these reasons, the Court determined that the extraterritorial application of
the statute was appropriate.
B. ALIEN TORT CLAiMs AcT
The following case involved an analysis of extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort
Claims Act. In Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C. (Rio Tinto V),216 a case that had been discussed in
the 2007 Year in Review,217 the Central District of California considered whether aliens
who had virtually no connection with the United States could sue a foreign international
mining group for violations of international law in connection with the operation of a
copper mine. The Court held that because the plaintiffs established only a weak nexus
between their claims and the United States, the Court should consider prudential exhaus-
tion before applying jurisdiction.21 8 After considerable review, the Court determined that
the plaintiffs adequately stated claims that the mining group had violated international
laws, the Geneva Convention, and crimes against humanity. 219 The Court concluded that
the prudential exhaustion requirement of the Alien Tort Claims Act was not appropriate
and that plaintiffs could bring their case for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
racial discrimination claims, despite their weak nexus with the United States. 220
In the case of In re South Afiican Apartheid Lit., in which individuals who suffered dam-
ages as a result of crimes of apartheid in South Africa brought claims against multinational
corporations who did business in apartheid South Africa, the Southern District of New
York rejected the defendants' claim that the court lacked jurisdiction. 221 The defendants
claimed that the court could not address torts stemming from extraterritorial events. The
court disagreed, noting that the Alien Tort Claims Act is a jurisdictional provision that
applies "universal norms that forbid conduct regardless of territorial demarcations or sov-
ereign prerogatives." 222 The court also noted that the Alien Tort Claims Act is not limited
by the locus of the injury, and therefore the court had the authority to hear claims for
torts committed abroad. 223
215. Id. at 801-802.
216. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
217. Jennifer Toole et al., International Litigation, 41 Irr'L LAW. 329, 350 (2007).
218. Rio Tinto, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
219. Id. at 1023.
220. Id. at 1030-31.
221. South African Apartheid Litig. v. Daimler, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
222. Id. at 246.
223. Id. at 247.
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VII. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgmentst
A. INTRODUCTON
In U.S. courts, recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and foreign
court judgments are governed by two distinct regimes. The United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Conven-
tion)224 governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and is imple-
mented in U.S. law through Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).225 The
New York Convention applies to awards "made in the territory" of a State other than the
enforcing State and to awards "not considered as domestic awards" in the enforcing
State. 226 State law, however, governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign court
judgments. Many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act, which is based upon the comity principles expressed in Hilton v. Guyot.227 In
states that have not enacted such a statute, courts generally apply the Hilton principles as a
matter of common law.
On January 19, 2009, the United States signed the Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, which was concluded by the Hague Conference on Private International Law
on June 30, 2005. The Convention seeks to "provide certainty and ensure the effective-
ness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to commercial transactions
.... ."228 Under this Convention, exclusive choice of court agreements require the chosen
court or courts of a contracting state to exercise jurisdiction and hear the parties' dispute
"unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State." 229 Additionally, a
non-chosen court in a contracting state must both decline jurisdiction to hear the parties'
dispute, subject to certain exceptions, 230 and recognize and enforce judgments issued by
the chosen court, also subject to certain exceptions. 231 The United States has not yet
ratified this Convention.
t Contributed by Neale H. Bergman, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, United States
Department of State, with special thanks to Alicia Cate, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser,
United States Department of State. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of
the Department of State or the U.S. Government.
224. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
225. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(2009).
226. New York Convention, supra note 224, art. I(1); see also Inter-American Convention on International
Conmnercial Arbitration, June 16, 1976, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Panama Convention], governing the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards among member-States of the Organization of Ameri-
can States who are party and implemented in U.S. law through Chapter 3 of the FAA. 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307.
For disputes involving parties to arbitration from States party to the Panama Convention, that Convention
applies to the exclusion of the New York Convention. Id. § 305.
227. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1885).
228. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at http://www.
hcch.net/indexen.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.
229. Id. art. 5.
230. Id. art. 6.
231. Id. arts. 8-9.
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B. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBTTRAL AWARDS
1. Non-Statutory Grounds for Vacatur and Modification of Arbitral Awards
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's holding last year in Hall St. Assoc, L.L.C. v. Mattel
Inc. 232 that "§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the
[FAA],"233 a number of U.S. Courts of Appeal have considered whether manifest disregard
of the law remains a viable ground for vacatur under the FAA.
In Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv.,234 the First Circuit held that an arbitral award
finding that an employee had been properly terminated was not issued in manifest disre-
gard of the law. Because the parties had not invoked the FAA's expedited review provi-
sions and the original action was brought "in Puerto Rico state court under a mechanism
provided by state law," the court did not address whether Hall St. precluded consideration
of manifest disregard of the law. 235 But the court did acknowledge in dicta that, because
of Hall St., manifest disregard "is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral
award in cases brought under the [FAA]."23 6
In Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assoc.,237 the Ninth Circuit reconsidered its applica-
tion of manifest disregard, on remand from the Supreme Court, to vacate an arbitral
award arising from a trademark dispute. The Court determined that Hall St. did not
undermine its prior precedent in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bacb Trade Serv.238 Similar to
the Second Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,239 the Court concluded
that manifest disregard was actually shorthand for Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.240
In Citigroup Global Mkt, Inc. v. Bacon,241 the Fifth Circuit, in vacating and remanding the
district court's vacatur of an arbitral award concerning a dispute over unauthorized bank
account withdrawals, held that manifest disregard of the law was no longer a valid inde-
pendent ground for vacatur. In reaching this conclusion, the Court criticized the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.242 for failing to address Hall St.'s
holding that Section 10 of the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur by narrowly
232. Hall St. Assoc. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
233. Id. at 588-91. In so holding, the Court, considering whether parties could supplement the grounds for
judicial review by contract, rejected Hall Street's argument that the grounds for vacatur set out in § 10 of the
FAA were not exclusive because manifest disregard of the law had also been recognized as one. Id. at 583-87.
However, the Court did not specifically address the significance of its holding for vacatur and modification of
non-domestic arbitral awards governed by the New York Convention or the Panama Convention in U.S.
courts. For further discussion of last year's Hall Street decision, see Cameron Holland, International Litigation,
43 ILr'L LAw. 505, 531 (2009).
234. Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 126 (1st Cir. 2009).
235. Id. at 125 n.3.
236. Id.
237. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 145
(2009).
238. Id. at 1290 (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that Kyocera held that "arbitrators 'exceed their powers' when the award is 'completely irrational' or
exhibits a 'manifest disregard of the law.'")).
239. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 145
(2009).
240. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290 ("manifest disregard of the law . . . is part of § 10(a)(4).").
241. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
242. Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. Williams, 300 F. App'x. 415 (2008), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 81 (2009).
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construing it to apply "only to contractual expansions of the grounds for vacatur." 243 The
Court did not criticize the holdings in Stolt-Nielsen or Comedy Club that manifest disregard
fell under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, but stated that Stolt-Nielsen's "description of mani-
fest disregard is very narrow." 244 Ultimately, the Court declared that, "from this point
forward, arbitration awards under the FAA may be vacated only for reasons provided in§ 10."245
2. Foreign States Are Not Entitled to Rights under the Due Process Clause
In Frontera Res. Azerhazjan Corp. v. State Oil Co. Azerbarfan,246 an important decision for
foreign governments and instrumentalities involved in recognition and enforcement ac-
tions, the Second Circuit held that foreign states are not entitled to the rights of "persons"
under the Due Process Clause. 247 In 2006, a Swedish arbitral tribunal awarded Frontera,
a Caymanian corporation, roughly US$1.24 million plus interest, arising from its oil pay-
ment dispute with the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR).248 Soon
after, the Southern District of New York dismissed Frontera's enforcement action for lack
of personal jurisdiction, holding that SOCAR had insufficient contacts with the United
States by reluctantly applying the due process analysis in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Nigeria249 and declining to find quasi in rem jurisdiction over SOCAR because Frontera
had failed to identify specific SOCAR assets within the court's jurisdiction.250
Reviewing the dismissal de novo, the Second Circuit first rejected Frontera's personal
jurisdiction argument 251 and then turned to Frontera's contention that foreign states and
their instrumentalities should not be entitled to Due Process Clause protections. Ac-
knowledging that case law had evolved since Texas Trading,252 the Court read the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 253 to imply that foreign states
should not enjoy due process protections because "States of the Union" do not. 254 The
Court was also persuaded by the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Price v. Libya,255 which de-
clared that foreign sovereigns should not receive more favorable treatment than "States of
243. Citigroup Global Mkts., 562 F.3d at 356.
244. Id. at 356-58. The Fifth Circuit also noted the First Circuit's rejection of manifest disregard in dicta in
Ramos-Santiago. Id. at 355.
245. Id. at 358.
246. Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp., 582 F.3d at 395.
247. Id. at 399.
248. Id. at 395.
249. Tex. Trading and Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 2009).
250. Fontera, 582 F.3d at 395.
251. In rejecting Frontera's argument that the district court's dismissal unnecessarily relied upon personal
jurisdiction, the Second Circuit pointed out that the district court had also analyzed whether it had quasi in
rem jurisdiction over any SOCAR property. Id. at 396-98. Then, the Court declared that the New York
Convention limits the types of challenges to confirmation, but "does nothing to alter the fundamental re-
quirement of jurisdiction over the party against whom enforcement is being sought." Id. at 397.
252. According to the Court, Texas Trading held that a foreign state qualified as a "person" under the Due
Process Clause and that to assert jurisdiction a court must both comply with the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a), and conduct a minimum contacts due process analysis. Fontera, 582 F.3d at 398.
253. Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
254. Fontera, 582 F.3d at 398.
255. Price v. Libya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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the Union" under the Due Process Clause absent compelling circumstances. 256 In hold-
ing that foreign states do not qualify as "persons" under the Due Process Clause and thus
overruling that aspect of Texas Trading,257 the Court still considered whether SOCAR
should have due process rights as an instrumentality even though Azerbaijan was not enti-
tled to them. To make this determination, the Court called for application of the U.S.
Supreme Court's framework in First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior
de Cuba (Bancec), which presumed that government instrumentalities established as distinct
entities are entitled to be treated as such unless the state exercises such extensive control
that either an agency relationship is formed or adherence to the corporate form would
result in injustice. 258 On remand, the Court directed the district court to consider
whether SOCAR was an agent of Azerbaijan under the Bancec framework, and if not,
whether SOCAR qualified for due process protections. 259
C. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
1. Non-Enforcement of a Petition under the Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction for Clear Misinterpretation of the Convention, Departure from Its
Fundamental Premises, or Failure to Meet a Minimum Standard of
Reasonableness
In Asvesta v. Petroutsas,260 the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a Greek court's order
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(Hague Convention),261 a decision with potentially significant ramifications due to the
Hague Convention's reliance on comity. As noted by the Court, the Hague Convention
seeks to promptly return any child "wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting
State" and "to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Con-
tracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States." 262 To do so, the
Convention is implicitly based upon the principle that consideration of custody rights
"should take place before the competent authorities in the State where the child had its
habitual residence prior to its removal."263 Under the Convention, courts shall promptly
order the return of a wrongfully removed or retained child if, upon the commencement of
proceedings, less than one year has passed since the removal or retention, subject to cer-
tain exceptions.26
256. Fontera, 582 F.3d at 399 (quoting Prce, 294 F.3d at 96).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 400.
259. Id. at 401.
260. Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2009).
261. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343
U.N.T.S. 49. It was implemented in U.S. law through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42
U.S.C. § 11601 (2009) [hereinafter ICARA]. Both the United States and Greece are signatories to the Con-
vention. Acceptances of Accessions, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.hcch.net/upload/abductoverview e.pdf.
262. Asvesea, 580 F.3d at 1003 (quoting Hague Convention, art. 1).
263. Id. at 1003-04 (quoting Elisa Prez-Vera, Hague Conference on Private International Law 428-29, 1 13
(1982)) [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report].
264. Id. at 1004 (quoting Hague Convention, art. 12). Under Article 3, a wrongful removal or retention
occurs when there is a breach of custody rights under the law of the child's habitual residence and those rights
were exercised and would continue to be exercised but for the removal or retention. Id. (quoting Hague
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As George Petroutsas and Despina Asvesta's marriage unraveled, he sent her an email
stating, "[g]o to Greece with the child and we will see how I will come to Greece to visit
him," and he subsequently consented in writing to Asvesta's taking the child to Greece for
a month.265 Not long after Asvesta left with the child, Petroutsas filed for divorce and
sought custody in California. When the California court granted custody to Petroutsas,
Petroutsas filed a Hague Convention petition, which was submitted to the Piraeus One-
Member Court of First Instance (Greece's Hague Court). Greece's Hague Court con-
cluded that the child's removal from the United States had not been "illegal" and rejected
the petition on grounds that: (1) Petroutsas had consented, (2) he had not been exercising
custody due to his indifference to his familial obligations, and (3) that the child's return to
the United States would expose him to "a severe danger" of "mental tribulation." 266 Nev-
ertheless, Petroutsas took the child and fled from Greece to California. Based on the
Greek custody order, Asvesta filed a Hague Convention petition in the Northern District
of California. Although the district court was troubled by the improper considerations of
Greece's Hague Court, "[tihe district court granted Asvesta's Hague petition and ordered
the child returned" with a stay pending appeal. 267 Petroutsas appealed, arguing that
Greece's Hague Court improperly evaluated the merits of the California court's custody
order and made unsupported findings. 268
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that, because the ICARA expressed "the
need for uniform international interpretation of the Convention," 269 it would consider
decisions from other federal and state courts, as well as courts of other contracting
states.270 The Court began its Hague Convention analysis, pursuant to Hilton v. Guyot,271
"'with an inclination to accord deference to' a foreign court's" 272 Hague petition, yet
pointed out that the Second Circuit in Diorinou v. Meziti, 27 3 the Third Circuit in Carras-
cosa v. McGuire,274 and the Ontario Court of Appeal in Pitts v. De Silva 275 all considered
Convention, art. 3). Article 13 provides certain exceptions to prompt return where (1) the petitioner had not
been exercising custody rights, consented, or subsequently acquiesced to the removal or retention, or (2) if
there is a "grave risk" of "expos[ing] the child to physical or psychological harm" or of putting the child in an
"intolerable situation." Id. (quoting Hague Convention, arts. 13(a)-(b)). With respect to these exceptions, the
U.S. Department of State has advised that those negotiating the Convention "were aware that any exceptions
had to be drawn very narrowly lest their application undermine the express purposes of the Convention. . .. "
Id. (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.Reg. at
10509). See also id. (quoting Ptrez-Vera Report at 435 ("IA] systematic invocation of the said exceptions,
substituting the forum chosen by the abductor for that of the child's residence, would lead to the collapse of
the whole structure of the Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its
inspiration.")).
265. Id. at 1005.
266. Id. at 1007.
267. Id. at 1010.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1009 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2009)).
270. Id. (citations omitted).
271. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
272. Asvesta, 580 F.3d at 1011.
273. Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2001). According to the Court, the Second Circuit in
Dionnou ultimately extended comity to Greece's Hague petition there because, despite "dubious determina-
tions regarding Article 13 exceptions," "the Greek court's finding that the mother['s]" retention of the child
in Greece was not wrongful was "entirely supportable." Asvesa, 580 F.3d at 1012.
274. Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2008).
275. Pitts v. De Silva, C46740, OJ. 36 (O.N.C.A. Jan. 10, 2008).
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the merits of the foreign court's Hague Convention determinations. Despite recognizing
that examination of the merits of another State's Hague Convention findings could under-
mine the Convention because "its success relies upon the faithful application of its provi-
sions," the Court concluded that it could properly refuse to extend comity if Greece's
Hague Court "clearly misinterprets the Hague Convention, contravenes the Convention's
fundamental premises or objectives, or fails to meet a minimum standard of
reasonableness."276
The Court then criticized Greece's Hague Court for focusing on irrelevant issues277
and failing to conduct the structured and objective analysis required by Convention. 278
Assuming that the Greek court denied Petroutsas' petition because he failed to show
wrongful retention, the Court found that the Greek court erred not only for failing to
determine the child's habitual residence, but also for finding that Petroutsas was not exer-
cising custody rights. 279 It concluded that Petroutsas' failure to show wrongful retention
"resulted from a clear misapplication" of the Hague Convention. 280 Concerning the con-
sent exception, the Court examined Petroutsas' email and subsequent written consent for
temporary travel281 and determined that the finding of "indefinite" consent was "unrea-
sonable." 282 Concerning the grave risk of harm exception, the Court criticized the Greek
court for "stepp[ing] out of its role as a Hague Convention tribunal by inquiring into the
best interests of the child" and held that its broad determination of grave risk "contra-
vened the intent of the Convention's drafters."283 Because the Greek court's decision was
"so egregious," the Court reversed the district court's extension of comity and remanded
for reconsideration of Asvesta's Hague Convention petition and determination of the
child's habitual residence. 284
2. Violation of International Concept of Due Process Mandates Non-Enforcement of Judgment
In Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 285 the Southern District of Florida refused to enforce a
ninety-seven million dollar Nicaraguan judgment under the Florida Uniform Out-of-
Country Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (FRA) 286 because, among other rea-
sons and of significance for future enforcement actions, the judgment was held to violate
the "international concept of due process." The Nicaraguan judgment concerned 150
Nicaraguan plaintiffs who were alleged "to have worked on banana plantations in Nicara-
gua between 1970 and 1982" where they were exposed to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP), a pesticide banned for links to sterility in the United States in 1977 and in Nica-
276. Asvesta, 580 F.3d at 1013-14.
277. Id. at 1016 (highlighting focus of Greece's Hague court on Petroutsas' "alleged infidelity, failure to be
the sole bread-winner . .. and refusal to speak to Asvesta in the last months of their marriage"). Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1017. The Ninth Circuit noted the importance of a habitual residence finding, because it is the
law of the State of habitual residence that governs custody rights determinations, violations of those rights,
and whether those rights were exercised. Id.
280. Id. at 1019.
281. O'Bryan, 556 F.3d at 387-88.
282. Asvesta, 580 F.3d at 1019-20.
283. Id. at 1020-21.
284. Id. at 1021.
285. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., No. 07-22693-CIV, 2009 WL 3398931, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
286. Id. (citing Fla. Stat. §§ 55.601-55.607 (2009)).
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ragua in 1993.287 Plaintiffs were awarded about $647,000 each from Dole and Dow
Chemical for exposure to DBCP, for DBCP-induced sterility, and for related psychologi-
cal effects under Nicaragua's Special Law 364.288
While an appeal was still ongoing in Nicaragua, the plaintiffs sought to enforce their
judgment in a Florida state court, but the defendants removed it to federal court.289 The
defendants argued four grounds for non-recognition under the FRA: (1) the Nicaraguan
court lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction or both under Special Law 364,
(2) Nicaragua did not follow procedures that comported with due process of law, (3) en-
forcement would violate public policy, and (4) Nicaragua's judicial system lacked impartial
tribunals. 290 Ultimately, the Court found that the defendants "established multiple, inde-
pendent grounds under the [FRA] that compel non-recognition" of the judgment2 91
In reaching this decision, the Court first provided an overview of DBCP cases. The
first cases were consolidated and dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds in Delgado
v. Shell Oil Co.,292 which prompted the passage of Special Law 364 in Nicaragua. 293 In
2003 and 2005, two other related enforcement actions failed in California.294 In 2005, a
group of DBCP defendants, including Dow, failed to obtain an injunction on due process
grounds against enforcement of Nicaraguan judgments because of a lack of personal juris-
diction over the plaintiffs.295 The court also described three recent cases brought directly
by Nicaraguan plaintiffs in California court, two of which were dismissed with prejudice
for fraud, 296 and the third, in which damages had already been awarded, was recently
remanded for consideration of the fraud findings in the other two.297
After providing more factual background on Special Law 364 and the Osorio v. Dole Food
Co. litigation in Nicaragua, the Court turned to the defendants' objections. First, the
Court found that the Nicaraguan trial court did not have either subject matter or personal
jurisdiction over the defendants, as required by the FRA, 298 because they had opted out of
287. Id. at *11.
288. Id. at *1.
289. Id. at *1, *10.
290. Id. at *11.
291. Id. at *41.
292. Id. at *1 (citing Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1362 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that
Nicaragua was the appropriate forum for Nicaraguan plaintiffs)).
293. Id. Special Law 364 was designed to deal with DBCP claims and was passed in 2000. Although most
cases are still pending, the Court noted that Nicaraguan courts have already awarded over $2 billion and that
in Herrera Rios v. Standard Fruit Co., a sister case in Nicaragua to the one before the court, the same trial
judge awarded 1248 plaintiffs roughly $648,000 each, totaling about $800 million. Id.
294. Id. at *2 (citing Franco v. Dow Chemical Co., No. CV 03-5094 NM (PJWx), slip op. at 7-16 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 21, 2003) (failing on technical and jurisdictional grounds); Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03-8846
(PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (failing because Nicaraguan court lacked personal jurisdiction).
295. Shell Oil, No. CV 03-8846 (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. Calderon,
422 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2005)).
296. Id. at *2-3 (citing Mejia v. Dole Food Co. and Riveria v. Dole Food Co., Los Angeles Sup. Ct. Case
Nos. BC340049, BC379820 (une 17, 2009) (order terminating both cases for fraud)).
297. Id. at *3 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Tellez, Los Angeles Sup. Ct. Case No. B216182, B216264 (uly 4,
2009)). The defendants also raised fraud concerns in this case, but the Court set aside the issue "in the event
that Defendants do not prevail on any other defenses to recognition." Id. at *10.
298. Id. at *13 (citing Fla. Stat. § 55.605(1)(b)-(c) (2009)).
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Nicaragua's jurisdiction under Special Law 364.299 Second, the Court considered whether
the judgment comported with the FRA's due process requirements, 30 particularly if it was
compatible with an "international concept of due process."30 Although acknowledging
that international due process norms differed from those in the United States, the Court
found that the irrebuttable presumption of causation under Article 9 of Special Law 364,
which precluded defendants from "offering scientific evidence that conclusively rebuts this
presumption," did not comport with international due process norms because it effectively
awarded hefty damages absent proof of causation. 302 The court also found that the dispa-
rate and unfair treatment of a defined group of foreign companies did not comport with
international norms, particularly because it "subject[ed] them to minimum damages so
dramatically out of proportion with damage awards against resident defendants." 3 3
Third, although acknowledging that the public policy basis for non-recognition under the
FRA "sets a high bar," the Court found that Special Law 364's irrefutable presumption of
causation was repugnant to Florida public policy because it "deprive[d] defendants of a fair
process."304 Fourth, in concluding that Nicaragua lacked impartial tribunals as required
by the FRA, the court not only considered Nicaragua's Country Report, which was pre-
pared by the U.S. Department of State and highlighted political influence and corruption
concerns, but also heard expert testimony about political interference, corruption, and
"the difference between Nicaragua's judicial structure on paper and in practice." 305
VIII. Forum Non Convenienst
A. INTRODUCTION
"The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court with venue to decline to exer-
cise its jurisdiction when the parties' and court's own convenience, as well as the relevant
public and private interests, indicate that the action should be tried in a different fo-
rum." 306 Under the federal law standard,
forum non conveniens dismissal is appropriate when: (1) the trial court finds that an
adequate alternative forum exists which posses jurisdiction over the whole case, in-
cluding all of the parties; (2) the trial court finds that all relevant factors of private
interest favor the alternate forum, weighing in the balance a strong presumption
against disturbing plaintiffs' initial forum choice; (3) if the balance of private interests
is at or near equipoise, the court further finds that factors of public interest tip the
balance in favor of trial in the alternate forum; and (4) the trial judge ensures that
299. Id. at *13-16 (explaining that Special Law 364 gives defendants the option to refuse to make required
deposits under the law if they waive their forum non conveniens defenses).
300. Id. at *16 (quoting Fla. Scat. § 55.605(1)(b)-(c) (2009)).
301. Id. (quoting Society of Lloyds v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (defining "international
concept of due process" as "a concept of fair procedures simple and basic enough to describe the judicial
processes of civilized nations, our peers")).
302. Id. at *22-25.
303. Id. at *34.
304. Id. at *35-37 (citations omitted).
305. Id. at *37-41.
t Contributed by Phillip B. Dye, Jr. and Justin R. Mariles of Vmson & Elkins LLP in Houston, Texas.
306. Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th C.ir 2009).
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plaintiffs can reinstate their suit in the alternate forum without undue inconvenience
or prejudice.307
Only when a district court has taken into account and weighed all of the relevant factors
may it grant a forum non conveniens dismissal. 308 A district court need not conclusively
establish its own jurisdiction before dismissing a suit for forum non conveniens.309
B. FORum NON CoNVENENs AND U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS
On several occasions in 2009, U.S. federal circuit courts dealt with the question of
whether district courts may dismiss cases brought by foreign plaintiffs from countries to
which the United States owes an international legal obligation to accord their citizens no
less favorable access to U.S. courts than an American national suing in the United States.
These bilateral treaties, often referred to as Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
(FCN) treaties, were invoked by plaintiffs in cases before both the Eleventh Circuit and
Seventh Circuit in an attempt to avoid forum non conveniens dismissal.
In a noteworthy case in the Eleventh Circuit, a plane crash in Milan, Italy of a Cessna
aircraft operated by a German charter led both European and American plaintiffs to file
suit against Cessna in the Southern District of Florida in King v. Cessna Aircraft Co.3 1o
Cessna moved for a forum non conveniens dismissal of the case. The district court
granted the dismissal with respect to the European plaintiffs and denied with respect to
the American plaintiffs. 311 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the dis-
trict court's decision to dismiss the European plaintiffs was proper. 312 One of the primary
arguments raised by the European plaintiffs was that a majority of defendants were "from
countries having bilateral treaties with the United States that accord them 'no less
favorable' access to U.S. courts to redress injuries caused by American actors."313 Al-
307. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1289-90 (lth Cir. 2009). The Su-
preme Court, in the seminal case of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, held that the private interest factors include:
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining the attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1947).
A recent restatement of the public interest factors has noted that they involve the consideration of:
(1) administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) imposition of jury duty on the
people of a community that has no relation to the litigation; (3) local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home; (4) the interest in having a diversity case tried in a forum familiar
with the law that governs the action; (5) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of law.
Loya v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 583 F.3d 656, 664 (9th Cir. 2009).
308. See, e.g., Windt v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 189-190 (3d Cir. 2008).
309. See Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
310. King, 562 F.3d at 1377-78.
311. Id. at 1378. This was in fact the second time that the district court had partially granted Cessna's
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, the district court's first decision having been vacated by the
Eleventh Circuit in King ex rel. Estate of King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1173 (11th Cir. 2007).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1382-83 (citing Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, art. V.4, July 26,
1949, 63 Stat. 255, 1949 WL 37628; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Denmark, arts.
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though these plaintiffs recognized that the general forum non conveniens rule is that a
foreign plaintiffs choice of forum is only entitled to weak deference, they argued that the
bilateral treaties between their respective countries and the United States guaranteeing
them access to American courts operated to bar the application of forum non conveniens
to their claims. Looking to the Second Circuit's earlier decision in Farmanfarmaian v.
Gulf Oil Corp.,3'4 the Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument, and held that "the
lesser deference given by the district court to the European Plaintiffs' choice of forum was
consistent with the treaty obligations of the United States." 315 The Eleventh Circuit rea-
soned that the focus of the forum non conveniens analysis is on convenience rather than
citizenship, and wrote that "[jiust as it would be less reasonable to presume an American
citizen living abroad would choose an American forum for convenience, so too can we
presume a foreign plaintiff does not choose to litigate in the United States for
convenience. "316
The Seventh Circuit confronted similar objections by plaintiffs arguing against a forum
non conveniens dismissal based on a FCN treaty between the United States and Argen-
tina.317 In Abad v. Bayer Corp., the Seventh Circuit decided a consolidated appeal from
two different groups of Argentine citizens who filed products-liability suits in U.S. federal
district courts against American manufactures for injuries sustained in Argentina. 31s One
group sued for injuries from blood products allegedly tainted with HIV; the other group
sued for allegedly faulty tires that resulted in an automobile accident. In both instances,
the district court judge dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints in favor of litigation in Argen-
tina.319 Plaintiffs asserted in their appeal that they were "entitled to all the litigation
rights of an American citizens" because of certain treaty obligations between the Unites
States and the Republic of Argentina. 320 The Seventh Circuit agreed, stating that plain-
tiffs were "entitled to sue these American corporations in American courts" and that "[iut
should make no difference that the plaintiffs are Argentines rather than Alaskans." 321 The
Court, however, did not accept the argument that application of the forum non ccn-
veniens doctrine to the Argentine plaintiffs' cases would necessarily result in a treaty viola-
tion.322 Instead, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissals, writing that "[w]hen the
plaintiff wants to sue on the defendant's home turf, and the defendant wants to be sued on
the plaintiffs home turf, all really that the court is left to weigh is the relative advantages
and disadvantages of the alternative forums" and that "there is no reason to place a thumb
on the scale" in favor of the foreign plaintiff or domestic defendant.323
V.1 & XXII.1, July 30, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 908, 1961 WL 62672). Plaintiffs from other countries with similar
bilateral treaties with United States were entitled to "freedom of access" or "access" to courts in the United
States. See id. at 1383 n.2 (citing, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, U.S.-Fin., art. I,
Aug. 10, 1934, 49 Stat. 2659, 1934 WL 29046).
314. Farmanfarmaian v. Guld Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
315. King, 562 F.3d at 1383.
316. Id. (citing Sinochem Int'l Co., 549 U.S. at 430).
317. Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2009).
318. Id. at 665.
319. Id. at 665, 668-69, 671.
320. Id. at 666 (citing Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between Argentina and the United
States, July 27, 1853, art. VIII, 10 Stat. 1005) (emphasis original).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 667.
323. Id.
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Similarly in Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp.,324 the Eleventh Circuit returned to the inter-
section of forum non conveniens and U.S. treaty obligations by examining forum non con-
veniens dismissal in the context of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air (the so-called Montrfal Convention). 325 This consolidated
appeal resulted from the forum non conveniens dismissal of wrongful death actions
brought by the survivors of passengers killed in the crash of a McDonnell Douglas aircraft
in the mountains of Venezuela.326 "Plaintiffs argue[d] that the district court was precluded
from applying this doctrine by the Montreal Convention, which is the exclusive means by
which international air travel passengers can seek damages for death or personal injury in
cases by it."327 The Montreal Convention contains several jurisdiction provisions, one of
which provides that "any action for damages ... must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the States Parties, either before a court in which an
action may be brought against the contracting carrier . . . or before the court having
jurisdiction at the place where the actual carrier has its domicile or its principal place of
business." 328 Because the United States was the territory of the contracting carriers, the
plaintiffs asserted that forum non conveniens could not apply, as "the Convention does
not specifically affirm the availability of forum non conveniens ... "329 The district court
disagreed, and relied on Article 3 3(4) of the Montrial Convention which states that "ques-
tions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court seised [sic] of the case." 330 In
granting forum non conveniens dismissal, "[t~he district court reasoned that because the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is part of United States civil procedure, the Convention
unambiguously permits its application in accordance with the law of the forum."331
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal, explaining "that a district
court may, where appropriate, exercise its discretion to apply forum non conveniens, with-
out interfering with the implementation of the Convention, so long as another Conven-
tion jurisdiction is available and can more conveniently adjudicate the claim."332
Interestingly, even in upholding dismissal, the Eleventh Circuit appeared to recognize a
new degree of deference somewhere between the strong deference given to the choice of
an American resident suing in U.S. courts, and the somewhat weaker deference of a for-
eign resident suit in U.S. courts. When plaintiffs come from country-parties to "interna-
tional treat[ies] with a specific venue provision," like the Montreal Convention, a certain
intermediate deference should be applied.333 According to the court, "[t]he logic of this
conclusion stems from the fact that the Convention has already done part of the work in
selecting a convenient forum-all potential jurisdictions under the Convention bear some
connection, broadly speaking, to the air crash" and the plaintiffs' "choice of forum is enti-
324. Pierre Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052, 1055-56 (11th Cir. 2009).
325. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, S.
Treaty Doc. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 (2000) [hereinafter Montrial Convention].
326. Pierre-Louis, 584 F.3d atl055.
327. Id. at 1056.
328. Id. at 1057 (quoting Montrial Convention, art. 46, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309).
329. Id. at 1057-58.
330. Id. at 1057 (quoting Montrial Convention, art. 33(4), 2242 U.N.T.S. 309).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1058.
333. Id. at 1059.
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tied to greater deference than non-U.S.-resident plaintiffs not acting pursuant to a
treaty." 334
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND ADMIRAL TY LAW
"The doctrine of forum non conveniens is well accepted in admiralty law."335 This is
hardly surprising given the inherent transnational nature of maritime commerce. None-
theless, in 2009 two different U.S. district courts dealt with admiralty appeals regarding
the question of whether federal statutes preempted a district court's ability to issue a fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal.
In Loya v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., the Ninth Circuit considered
"whether a claim implicating the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C.
§ 30301 et seq., is subject to dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens."336 In Loya, the
widow of the decedent brought claims under DOHSA and Washington state law arising
out of the death of her husband who expired during a scuba-diving trip off the coast of
Mexico.33 7 The plaintiff argued that "DOHSA effectively precludes dismissal on the
grounds offorum non conveniens" on the basis that "Congress did not intend for the forum
non conveniens doctrine to eliminate access by an American beneficiary to a remedy under
DOHSA for the wrongful death of an American on the high seas."338 In deciding Loya,
the district court relied on Pain v. United Technologies Corp.,339 holding that "DOHSA ac-
tions are within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts and, whether or not
DOHSA applies to this action, the Act does not preclude forum non conveniens
dismissal." 34o
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals compared the provisions of DOHSA to the Jones
Act.341 Unlike DOHSA, the Ninth Circuit explained, the Jones Act "has a specific venue
provision."342 This provision states that "[a]n action under this section shall be brought in
the judicial district in which the employer resides or the employer's principal office is
located." 343 In affirming the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit stated "DOHSA
neither explicitly, nor implicitly, rejects application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens."344
Another recent admiralty case in which the application of a forum non conveniens dis-
missal was upheld by a circuit court is Compania Naviera Joanna SA v. Koninklyke Boskalis
Westminster NV.345 In this factually complex but intriguing case, the Fourth Circuit faced
334. Id. at 1061 (emphasis original).
335. Loya, 583 F.3d at 661.
336. Id. at 659. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, "DOHSA was enacted in 1920 to overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), stating that admiralty afforded no remedy for
wrongful death in the absence of an applicable state or federal statute." Laya, 583 F.3d at 660-61.
337. Id. at 660.
338. Id. at 660.
339. Pain v. United Tech. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
340. Loya, 583 at F.3d at 660.
341. Id. at 661-62. The Jones Act is set out at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2009), and allows injured American
seaman to bring actions against their employers in the United States.
342. Loya, 583 F.3d at 662.
343. 46 U.S.C. § 30104(b) (2009).
344. Loya, 583 F.3d at 663.
345. In Re Compania Naviera Joanna SA, 569 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2009).
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an unusual situation in which the plaintiff, MSC Shipping, requested a forum non con-
veniens dismissal of its own case 346 brought under the Limitation of Liability Act.347
MSC Shipping's case originated from a collision in Chinese waters between a Panama-
nian-owned and Swiss-chartered freighter, the MSC foanna, and a dredging vessel, the
W.D. Fairway, owned and chartered by Netherlands corporations and sub-chartered to a
Chinese dredging firm. 348
The facts as reported by the Fourth Circuit are complex. The district court below
found that:
In an effort to force [MSC Joanna's owners and charterers MSC Shipping] to take
advantage of the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act, which in the circumstances of this
case would probably result in a more favorable outcome to [W.D. Fairway's Dutch
owners and charterers] BoskaliS349, Boskalis began filing damage claims in the United
States against MSC Shipping, demanding in each $326 million in damages.350
Further, "[b]ecause MSC Shipping could not be found in the United States, Boskalis
employed Admiralty Rule B and attached other, unrelated ships chartered by MSC Ship-
ping that were calling on U.S. ports."35 In order to prevent further attachments of its
ship, MSC Shipping commenced its own action in U.S. courts so as to "enjoin all of
Boskalkis' actions in favor of one action and then to have it dismissed under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens."352 Boskalis challenged MSC Shipping's request for forum non
conveniens dismissal of MSC Shipping's own case, arguing that "the doctrine does not
apply to limitation-of-liability actions" and asserting that MSC Shipping's case, which it
filed with the explicit intention of seeking forum non conveniens dismissal, constituted
improper use of the Limitation of Liability Act.353
The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected both of Boskalis's arguments. According to the
court, prevailing case law allowed for the application of forum non conveniens in admi-
ralty cases generally, with no exception for limitation-of-liability cases. 354 The Fourth
Circuit's decision to apply forum non conveniens dismissal in this matter is of particular
interest, given that Admiralty Rule B and the Limitation of Liability Act both involve a
form of quasi in rem jurisdiction. In instances in which "there is no other forum" besides
the United States where a defendant has property located to satisfy a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and jurisdiction is quasi in rem in nature, there is a contrary argument that a
346. Id. at 195.
347. 46 U.S.C. § 30501 (2009). The Fourth Circuit explains "upon receipt of a claim arising from damage
at sea or a shipwreck," the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act allows "the owner or charterer of the vessel [to]
commence an action ... by depositing a fund with the court for the benefit of all claimants equal to the value
of the owner's interest in the vessel and pending freight at the end of the voyage or following any wreck"
Compania Navierea Joanna SA, 569 F.3d at 198.
348. Compania Navierea Joanna SA, 569 F.3d at 193-95.
349. Boskalis was concerned that a parallel action pending in Chinese admiralty court would not allow it to
collect the increased amount of damages available to it in the United States under the United States Limita-
tion of Liability Act. Id. at 196.
350. Id.
3 5 1. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 198-99.
354. Id. at 199.
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forum non conveniens dismissal is not proper on the grounds that there is no alternative
forum besides the United States, as one jurisdiction cannot exercise quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion over property in another forum. 355 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit opined that
MSC Shipping's use of the Limitation of Liability Act was proper and fulfilled at least one
of the Act's purposes, as "MSC Shipping was simply seeking to collect all of the cases in
the United States relating to the Chinese collision and have them subjected to the test for
determining whether they should be dismissed under the forum non conveniens
doctrine." 356
D. FORUM NON CONVENIENs AND PRIOR DETERMINATIONS OF ADEQUATE AND
AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE FORUMS
Courts in forums that frequently attract foreign plaintiffs are often called to rule upon
the availability and adequacy of the same proposed alternative forum time and again. 357
Mexican plaintiffs in the case of In re Ford Motor Co. brought suit in Texas for injuries
suffered in automobile accidents in Mexico allegedly caused by defective car tires. 35
Their cases were subsequently transferred to a multi-district litigation (MDL) proceeding
in the Seventh Circuit.359 Defendant automobile manufacturer Ford and tire manufac-
turer Bridgestone/Firestone moved the MDL court for a forum non conveniens dismissal
of the plaintiffs' cases for litigation in Mexico,360 but the plaintiffs argued that dismissal
would not be proper, and submitted to the district court ex parte decisions from Mexican
trial courts stating that these courts would not hear cases like those of the plaintiffs if filed
in Mexico. 361 Relying solely on these decisions, which stated that the Mexican courts did
not have competence to hear cases similar to those of the In re Ford plaintiffs, the MDL
court rejected the defendants' motion and "agreed with plaintiffs that Mexico [was] not an
available forum," 362 eventually referring the case back to the Western District of Texas for
trial.363 The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration with the Texas trial court,
again requesting a forum non conveniens dismissal.364 The Texas trial court, however,
declined to reconsider the decision of the MDL court that determined that Mexico was
not an adequate alternative forum.365
Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone then sought a writ of mandamus from the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which granted the writ and reversed the decision of the MDL court and Texas federal
district court.366
355. See, e.g., TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
356. Compania Navierea Joanna SA, 569 F.3d at 199.
357. As previously explained, in order for a court to grant forum non conveniens dismissal, the defendant
must identify an adequate alternative forum that is available for plaintiffs case. See Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1289-
90.
358. In re Ford Motor Co., 580 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 2009) (pet. for en banc rehearing pending).
359. Id. at 310.
360. Id. at 309-310.
361. Id. at 311. It is important to note that these ex parte decisions were not obtained by the In re Ford





366. Id. at 317.
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The Fifth Circuit explained that it had found Mexico to be an available adequate alter-
native forum on numerous prior occasions,367 writing that "[t]hese many decisions create a
nearly airtight presumption that Mexico is an available forum." 368 The Fifth Circuit
stated "[d]istrict courts do not have to start from scratch each time they consider a forum's
availability; if we have found a forum to be available in earlier cases, district courts can rely
on our precedent in similar cases to hold that it is still available." 369 In addition, the Fifth
Circuit explained that the MDL court and Texas district court had erred in relying solely
on the Mexican court's ex parte jurisdictional decisions determining that Mexico was not
an available forum, opining that the American courts should look beyond the orders to
expert testimony, relevant Mexican statutes, or case law, and that the plaintiffs "have not
submitted any evidence to show that these orders must be issued without the opposing
counsel's being present" as occurred in the Mexican proceeding.370
IX. Parallel Proceedingst
Parallel proceedings exist where "substantially the same parties are litigating substan-
tially the same issues simultaneously in two fora." 371 With the continued expansion of
international commerce, in 2009 U.S. courts were again confronted with disputes involv-
ing parallel proceedings in foreign jurisdictions. Noteworthy this year was that U.S.
plaintiffs seeking to prevent defendants from pursuing foreign suits often sought anti-suit
injunctions. Five recent decisions involving such injunctions are discussed below.
Although there is no debate that a court may issue an anti-suit injunction enjoining
foreign proceedings, 372 debate persists as to what test courts should apply to determine
whether to issue such an injunction. Courts agree on the threshold inquiry, which con-
sists of determining first whether the parties are the same in both suits and second,
whether resolution of the case before the enjoining court is dispositive of the other suit.3 73
Courts disagree, however, regarding the weight to be attributed to international comity
considerations. 374 Under the conservative standard, the court must determine first,
whether an action in a foreign jurisdiction would prevent U.S. jurisdiction or threaten a
367. Id. at 313-14 (citing DTEX, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 508 F.3d 785, 804 (5th Cir. 2007); Vasquez
v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377,
380 n.3 (5th Cit. 2002)).
368. In re Ford Motor Co., 580 F.3d at 314.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original).
f Contribution by Lorraine de Germiny, Associate, ing & Spalding LLP, Paris, France. Special thanks
to Catalina Constantina for her research assistance.
371. Chalmers v. Gray, No. 3:09-CV-232, 2009 WL 1748009, at *1 (N.D. Ind. June 18, 2009) (citing
Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Carr, 903 F.2d 1154, 1156 (7th Cir. 1990)); Royal and Sun Alliance Ins. Co.
of Can. v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2006).
372. Applied Med. Distrib. Corp. v. Surgical Co. BV, No. 09-55155, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24117, at *28
(9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2009); see also Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int'l, Ltd., 556 F.3d
459, 471 (6th Cir. 2009); SEC v. Pension Fund of Am., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
373. See, e.g., Software AG, Inc. v. Consist Software Solutions, Inc., 323 F. App'x. 11, 12 (2d Cir. 2009),
Pension Fund ofAm., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
374. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2006); Goss Int'l Corp. v.
Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Zimnicki v. Neo-
Neon Int'l, Ltd., No. 06-C-4879, 2009 WL 2392065, *2 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2009); Albemarle Corp. v. As-
trazeneca UK Ltd, No. 5:08-1085, 2009 WL 902348, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2009).
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vital U.S. policy and second, whether domestic interests outweigh the concerns of interna-
tional comity.37s Under the liberal standard, the court will order an anti-suit injunction
where necessary to prevent duplicate and vexatious foreign litigation and to avoid incon-
sistent judgments. 376
A. ZIMNII AND THE "LAXER" STANDARD OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
As noted by the Northern District of Illinois in Zimnicki v. Neo-Neon International Ltd.,
the Seventh Circuit has yet to adopt an approach. 377 In Zimnicki, the plaintiffs sued in the
United States for copyright infringement and the defendant brought suit in China seeking
primarily declaratory relief. Faced with a motion for an anti-suit injunction, the district
court did not specifically adopt either the "conservative" or the "liberal" approach, noting
nevertheless that the Seventh Circuit was "incline[d] toward the laxer standard."378 Under
either approach, the plaintiffs request had to be denied because it failed to demonstrate
that the U.S. litigation would be dispositive of the defendant's Chinese lawsuit. Although
the parties were the same, the plaintiff had not shown that the Chinese intellectual prop-
erty laws applicable to the declaratory judgment action were "the same or similar to the
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act." 379
B. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS AND FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES
When a dispute arises out of an international contract, forum-selection clauses often
factor into a court's decision to stay or dismiss proceedings or to issue an anti-suit injunc-
tion. In Applied Medical Distribution Corp. v. Surgical Co.,3 80 the Ninth Circuit was called
upon to determine whether the district court had abused its discretion in declining to
enjoin the defendant from pursuing relief in Belgium. Indeed, shortly after the plaintiffs
61ing of the action before the district court, the defendant had filed suit in Belgium. The
claims arose out of a distribution agreement which provided that it "shall be governed by
and construed under the laws of the State of California" and that "federal and state courts
within the State of California shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute
arising out of this Agreement." 381 The district court had denied the anti-suit injunction
on grounds that the Belgian claims were "potentially broader." 382
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had abused its discretion in denying the
injunction. The district court had erred in part in requiring that the claims in the foreign
and domestic actions be "identical" instead of making the more functional inquiry applied
by the Ninth Circuit in E. &J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.383 Under this standard,
375. Zimnicki, 2009 WL 2392065, at *2; Goss, 491 F.3d at 363; see also Answers in Genesis of Ky., 556 F.3d at
363; Albemarle, 2009 WL 902348, at *7.
376. Zimnicki, 2009 WIL 2392065, at *2; Goss, 491 F.3d at 360; Albemarle, 2009 WL 902348, at *6.
377. Zimnicki, 2009 WL 2392065.
378. Id. at *2.
379. Id. at *3.
380. Applied Med. Distrib. Corp. v. Surgical Co. BV, No. 09-55155, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24117 (9th Cir.
Nov. 3, 2009).
381. Id. at *3.
382. Id. at *6-7.
383. E. 'rJ. Gallo Winery, 446 F. 3d at 984.
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claims are functionally the same if the domestic suit can dispose of the issues in the foreign
suit and these issues fall under the forum-selection clause.384 Requiring issues to be "iden-
tical" would be "counterproductive." 385 The Court stated that:
[F]orum selection clauses would lose their reliability and robustness if a party could
avoid them simply by waiting until a local suit is filed, and then file a foreign action
that, despite being easily disposed of by resolution of the local action, is in some way
not identical in form, a likely possibility because the verbal form of laws in different
countries will inevitably differ. 386
Furthermore, "differences between foreign and domestic law do not necessarily make
the 'issues' different."387 The court must determine, in addition to the threshold inquiry,
whether the foreign litigation would "frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunc-
tion" and "whether the impact on comity would be tolerable."388 The Ninth Circuit held
first that the initial (California) action was dispositive of the later (Belgian) action because
all of the Belgian claims could be litigated and resolved in the California action.389 Sec-
ond, denying the anti-suit injunction would frustrate California's strong policy favoring
enforcement of forum-selection clauses. 390 Third, enjoining a later-filed foreign suit
which contravenes the forum-selection clause was not contrary to comity.391
C. WHEN THE COLORADO RIVER DocrRiNE MEETs ARBITRATION
A notable decision involving arbitration and parallel foreign court proceedings came
from the Sixth Circuit with Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int'l,
Ltd.392
The dispute arose out of an agreement that contained both a non-exclusive forum-
selection clause 393 and an arbitration clause. After the Australian defendant had brought
suit before Australian courts, the claimant moved to compel arbitration and sought an
anti-suit injunction from the Eastern District of Kentucky. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court to compel arbitration but to deny an anti-suit injunction.
Several aspects of the decision are of interest. First, the Court rejected the defendant's
argument that the lower court should have abstained on the basis of international comity.
It noted "whether to abstain in regard to a motion to compel arbitration because of inter-
national comity concerns is an issue of first impression in this circuit."394 The Court
applied the well-known factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in Colorado River Water
384. Applied Med. Distrib. Corp., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24117, at *14, *16.
385. Id. at *15.
386. Id.
387. Id. at *24.
388. Id. at *8.
389. Id. at *12.
390. Id. at *27.
391. Id. at *29.
392. Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int'l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2009).
393. The agreement provided that "the law applicable to the State of Victoria, Australia" applied and that
"[t]he parties submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of its courts and courts of appeal." Id. at 464.
394. Id. at 467.
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Conservation Dirt. v. United States,395 to determine whether to abstain in favor of the for-
eign proceedings. Abstention, "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a
District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it,"396 may be based on such
factors as inconvenience of the federal forum, desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation,
and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained. 397 The Sixth Circuit transposed the
Colorado River factors to the case before it stating that they were "the most applicable ...
because those factors and their relative weight match most closely the public-policy con-
cerns the Supreme Court has identified as vital in the area of arbitration."39 8 After analyz-
ing the Colorado River factors, the Court looked to the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, noting that it must compel
arbitration unless the arbitration agreement is "null and void, inoperative, or incapable of
being performed."399
Next, the Court considered the defendant's cross-appeal of the district court's order
declining to issue a foreign anti-suit injunction. It stated that it needed "to look at
whether an injunction is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of a federal court or if al-
lowing the foreign litigation to continue would allow a party 'to evade the forum's impor-
tant policies'." 400 It found that because Australia is also a signatory of the New York
Convention, "it would be difficult" to find that the defendant was trying to evade an im-
portant public policy of this forum.O1 Furthermore, because the parties had agreed to
suspend the Australian proceedings pending the outcome of the U.S. court action, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the anti-suit injunction.402
D. DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S APPROACH TO FOREIGN FORUM-SELECTION
CLAUSE
The District of South Carolina granted an anti-suit injunction in Albemarle Corp. v.
Astrazeneca UKLtd.@3 The dispute arose out of an agreement between a U.S. corporation
and a U.K. corporation with the following forum-selection clause: "this contract shall be
subject to English law and the jurisdiction of the English High Court."404 The Claimant
filed suit in South Carolina and moved for an order enjoining the defendant from filing a
similar suit in English court.
The district court stated that, before examining the reasonableness of the forum-selec-
tion clause, it had to determine whether the clause was mandatory or non-mandatory.405
The court observed that "the word 'shall' alone is not enough to create a mandatory fo-
rum-selection clause[.]" 406 In IntraComm, Inc. v. Bajaj, on which the court relied, the
395. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
396. Id. at 813.
397. Id. at 818.
398. Answers in Genesis of Ky., 556 F.3d at 467.
399. Id. at 469 (citing to New York Convention art. 11(3)).
400. Id. at 471.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 472.
403. Albemarle Corp. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., No. 5:08-1085, 2009 WL 902348 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2009).
404. Id. at *2.
405. Id. at *3.
406. Id.
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court held that a forum-selection clause stating "either party shall be free to pursue its
rights . . . in a court of competent jurisdiction in Fairfax County, Virginia" was non-
mandatory.407 Nevertheless, the court concluded that in Albermarle, despite the "shall be
subject to" language that "absent further language making England the mandatory venue,"
the forum-selection clause was not mandatory and therefore the question of its reasona-
bleness was moot.408 It went on to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds.40 9
The district court also granted the plaintiff's anti-suit injunction. After noting the cir-
cuit split on foreign anti-suit injunctions and the lack of controlling Fourth Circuit prece-
dent, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction under either
standard. 410 A suit in England would be duplicative because it would threaten the jurisdic-
tion of the district court.411
E. INTERNATIONAL CoMITy CONSIDERATIONS
Finally, the findings and observations of the Southern District of Florida in SEC v.
Pension Fund of America4 12 regarding international comity and anti-suit injunctions merit
attention. The case involved a receivership action initiated by the SEC and a Costa Rican
citizen seeking the return of several million dollars allegedly invested in the Pension Fund
of America. The individual later filed both criminal and civil actions in Costa Rica. The
receiver accordingly sought to enjoin the Costa Rican civil litigation.
The court held that "[iln light of the totality of the circumstances, and taking into
account important considerations of international comity, the equities here weigh strongly
in favor of an injunction."413 The court found that the Costa Rican litigation was "inter-
dictory," that it was, "designed to interfere with the proceedings in this Court and to
evade this Court's judgments." 414 According to the court, comity considerations were
nonetheless respected because the receiver was not seeking to enjoin the Costa Rican
criminal proceedings and because the case "presented no conflicting national priorities or
regulatory schemes." 415 Additionally, the Costa Rican courts had rendered no judgments
that the U.S. court's anti-suit injunction could disrupt.416 The district court thus granted
the anti-suit injunction.417
407. IntraComm, Inc. v. Bajaj, 492 F.3d 285, 290 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
408. Albemarle, 2009 WL 902348, at *3.
409. Id. at *6.
410. Id. at *6-8.
411. Id. at *7-8.
412. SEC v. Pension Fund of Am., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
413. Id. at 1346.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1347.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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